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NOTE
PROOF OF THE CORPUS DELICTI ALIUNDE
THE DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION
Analytically, proof of the commission of a crime can be divided into
three elements, each of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the basic injury, such as the death in murder, the burning in arson, the
missing property in theft, or the intercourse in rape, (2) the fact that the
basic injury was the result of a criminal, rather than a natural or accidental,
cause, and (3) the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime.' The first two of these elements constitute the corpus delicti or body
of the crime,2 which is proved when the prosecution has shown that a crime
has been committed by someone as, for example, where there is evidence
that a body has been found and that death has been caused by a bullet
wound in the back. Most jurisdictions in the United States hold that the
defendant's confession alone is not sufficient proof of the corpus delicti and,
therefore, that there must be proof, independent of the confession, that a
crime was committed.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In England
Originally in England the defendant's confession was sufficient by
itself to support a conviction. But in a few cases in which no body was
found and conviction was based solely on a confession, the courts experi-
enced the shock of having the person who had been thought dead turn up
alive after his supposed murderer had been executed. In a seventeenth
century prosecution 3 it was shown that, when the defendant's master failed
to return home one evening, the defendant was sent by the mistress of the
house to look for the missing man and, when the defendant himself did not
return, the master's son was sent to look for both. He succeeded in finding
the servant, and together they questioned a woman who had found a hat
which apparently belonged to the missing man. The hat, which was
hacked and bloody, led them to believe that the master had been murdered.
However, a search for the body proved unfruitful. Suspicion was directed
toward the defendant, since he had not returned when sent to look for his
master, and after questioning he confessed to the murder, implicating his
1. 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2072 (3d ed. 1940) ; see also 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 640 (11th ed. 1935).
2. See text at note 63 infra.
3. Perrys' Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (1660).
(638)
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brother and mother. The three were tried, convicted, and executed, solely
on the basis of the disappearance of the allegedly murdered man, the finding
of the hat, and the confession of the defendant. After a few years the
master returned, stating that he had been waylaid, kidnapped and held as a
slave in Turkey.
This and similar cases led the British courts to question the sufficiency
of confessions to prove that a crime had been committed. Lord Matthew
Hale, prompted by two cases which did not involve confessions but in
which the defendants were convicted of murder solely on circumstantial
evidence of death and in both of which the supposedly murdered man
returned alive, maintained:
"I would never convict any person for stealing the goods cujusdam
ignoti merely because he would not give an account of how he came
by them, unless there were due proof made, that a felony was com-
mitted of these goods. . . . I would never convict any person of
murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were proved to be done,
or at least the body found dead. . .. " 4
This statement is susceptible of two different interpretations: (1) the fact
that a murder or manslaughter has been committed must be proved by find-
ing the dead body with evidence of criminal causation, or as a minimal
requirement the dead body must be found,5 or (2) if the body is not found,
the fact that a death has occurred may be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence." The former interpretation would lead to the conclusion that de-
fendant's confession is not sufficient for conviction without, at least, the
dead body. Since it is stating the obvious to say that proof of death must
precede conviction of murder or manslaughter, and since Hale used the
words "at least" and was prompted by cases involving wrongful convic-
tions grounded on circumstantial evidence, it seems probable that the former
interpretation is correct; but interpretations of Hale in subsequent cases
have been very ambiguous.7
In Queen v. Unkles,8 a prosecution for illegal communication of in-
formation at a polling place, the court, citing Hale, said by way of dictum
that a defendant could not be convicted of murder on his confession
unless the dead body is found. But the court also stated that this is "a rule
of judicial practice" rather than part of the law of evidence. In Rex v.
4. 2 HALE, PLxAS OF THE CROWVN 290 (1847).
5. This interpretation is given to Hale's statement in Queen v. Unkles, 8 Ir.
R.C.L. 50, 58 (Q.B. 1873); United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,707, at
642 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) ; cf. State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 275, 161 N.W. 1022, 1024
(1917).
6. This interpretation is given to Hale's statement in Rex v. Hindmarsh, 2 Leach
C.C. 648, 650-51 (1792) (by implication); Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 745
(1879); cf. Ruloff v. People, 18 N.Y. 179 (1858). See also letter from Director
of Public Prosecutions, London, dated Sept. 18, 1954, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
7. Coimpare cases cited in note 5 supra, with cases cited in note 6 supra.
8. 8 Ir. R.C.L. 50 (1873).
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Kersey,9 the defendant's confession and medical testimony that she recently
had given birth to a child were held insufficient evidence of murder of the
child, since there was no evidence, other than the confession, that the child
had been born alive. In 1913 in Rex v. Sykes,'0 in which the court
affirmed a conviction of murder on the basis of defendant's confession plus
corroborating proof, the opinion was ambiguous 11 as to whether the con-
fession would have been sufficient by itself. , Likewise, the 1934 case of
Rex v. Davidson,'2 in which a murder conviction was affirmed solely on
the defendant's testimony, left unanswered the question of whether the de-
fendant's confession out of court would have been sufficient.
Meanwhile, as a result of the "best evidence" principle 3 the rule
developed in England that the defendant's confession of a former marriage
was not sufficient evidence upon which to found a bigamy conviction.' 4
Upon a review of the cases, if it can be said that the English courts
adhere to any rule requiring evidence of the corpus delicti independent
of the defendant's confession, the rule apparently applies to murder and
bigamy only.' 5
In the United States
The unsettled state of the English law left the United States without
any consistent doctrine to follow. However, once the rule had been estab-
lished by a few courts in this country, other courts followed. The early
cases developed from several lines of authority. Only one court laid down
the rule in the belief that the English cases meant that a confession is in-
sufficient if unsupported by other evidence.' Some courts, motivated by
both English and American cases in which there had been false convictions
based on the defendant's confession, followed Hale's statement.'1 Other
courts, in establishing the rule, relied on statements by certain American
authors that such was the law; "8 and still other courts, without citing any
9. 21 Cox C.C. 690 (1908); see Rex v. McNicholl, [1917] 2 Ir. R. 557, in
which a conviction of murder of an illegitimate infant was affirmed on defendant's
confession plus other evidence; there was no statement that the other evidence was
essential.
10. 8 Cr. App. R. 233 (1913).
11. Wigmore says that this case apparently requires evidence in addition to de-
fendant's confession. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2070, n.5 (3d ed. 1940). Two English
authors, on the other hand, claim that this case holds the confession alone to be
sufficient. PHipsoN, EVIDENCE 266 (9th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1952); RoscoE,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 38 (16th ed. 1952).
12. 25 Cr. App. R. 21 (1934).
13. See 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2084 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Regina v. Savage, 13 Cox C.C. 178 (1876). But cf. Queen v. Newton, 2
Mo. & R. 503 (1843). See 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2086 (3d ed. 1940).
15. See RoscoE, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 38 (16th ed. 1952).
16. People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 148 (N.Y. 1836).
17. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 636, No. 16,707 (C.C.D. Me. 1858);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 809 (Va. 1871); cf. Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark.
720, 745 (1879).
18. E.g., Mose v. State, 36 Ala. 211, 232 (1860) (cites WHARTON, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAw § 683, at 183 (1846)); United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,707, at 643 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) (quotes GREENLEAF [apparently 1 EVIDENCE §216
(2d ed. 1844) ]).
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authority, discussed the various possible rationales and reached the con-
clusion that the corpus delicti must be proved aliunde the defendant's con-
fession. 19
While the English rule had been restricted to murder and bigamy, the
American versions extended to almost all crimes. This expansion probably
took place, depending on the source of the rule in the respective state,
either because the rule was discussed in murder cases in general terms,
because Hale's statement includes both robbery and murder, or because
the rationale formulated by the courts was apparently as pertinent to other
crimes as to murder.2
Today, evidence of the corpus delicti in addition to the defendant's
confession is required by statute in nine states 21 and by judicial decision 
22
in thirty-two other states, seven federal circuits and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. Three states and two federal circuits require
some extrinsic evidence of a corroborative nature lending credence to the
confession but not necessarily proving the corpus delicti.2 Massachusetts 2 4
19. Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157 (Ct. Err. & App. 1853); State v. Long,
1 Haywood (2 N.C.) 455 (Super. Ct. 1797).
20. See State v. Geltzeiler, 101 N.J.L. 415, 128 At. 240 (1925).
21. Aiu. STAT. ANN. §43-2115 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. §38-420 (Rev. ed.
1954); IowA CODE ANN. § 782.7 (1950); Ky. CODES, ClUm. P-Ac. § 240 (1948);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.03 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2510 (1949);
N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. § 395; N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2729 (1943) ; ORE. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 26-937 (1940).
22. United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Di Orio, 150 F.2d 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 771 (1945) ; Bell v. United
States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 930 (1951); Vogt v.
United States, 156 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d
531 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1940);
Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Forte v. United States,
94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), on certified qtestions, 302 U.S. 220 (1937) ; Rutland v. State,
31 Ala. App. 43, 11 So.2d 768 (1943); State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757
(1947) ; People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140, 131 Pac. 127 (1913) ; State v. Guastamachio,
137 Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429 (1950) ; State v. Kohm, 103 A.2d 781 (Del. Super. Ct.
1954) ; McElveen v. State, 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954) ; State v. Downing, 23 Idaho
540, 130 Pac. 461 (1913); People v. Gavurnik, 2 Ill.2d 190, 117 N.E.2d 782 (1954);
Dennis v. State, 230 Ind. 210, 102 N.E.2d 650 (1952); State v. Morgan, 157 La.
962, 103 So. 278 (1925) ; State v. Jones, 108 A.2d 261 (Me. 1954) ; Davis v. State,
202 Md. 463, 97 A.2d 303 (1953); People v. Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d
167 (1949) ; Buford v. State, 69 So.2d 826 (Miss. 1954) ; State v. Thompson, 333
Mo. 1069, 64 S.W.2d 277 (1933); Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1
(1950) ; State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950) ; State v. Lindemuth,
56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952); State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773
(1954) ; State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916) ; Brown v. State,
274 P.2d 779 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497,
31 A.2d 155 (1943) ; State v. Boswell, 73 R.I. 358, 56 A.2d 196 (1947) ; State v.
Thomas, 222 S.C. 484, 73 S.E.2d 722 (1952); Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235
S.W.2d 818, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951); Cohron v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 331, 242 S.W.2d 776 (1951); State v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954);
Carnbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 825, 75 S.E.2d 468 (1953); State v. Longe, 96
Vt. 7, 116 Atl. 81 (1922) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951) ;
State v. Blackwell, 102 W. Va. 421, 135 S.E. 393 (1926); Curran v. State, 12 Wyo.
553, 76 Pac. 577 (1904).
23. See note 137 infra.
24. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947) ; Common-
wealth v. Zelensld, 287 Mass. 125, 191 N.E. 355 (1934).
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and Wisconsin, 25 disclaim adherence to any rule requiring such evidence,
and the New Hampshire 26 and South Dakota courts have been completely
silent on the subject.
RATIONALE
The courts seldom have articulated a rationale for the corpus delicti
rule. When cases come up in the "gray area" where it is not certain
whether the rule should apply, the courts usually base their results on the
great weight of judicial authority in support of the rule, rather than on an
independent rationale. Moreover, when discussed, the rationale rarely is
lucid and at best seems to be composed of one or more of several factors.
The most pertinent of these factors is the general distrust of confes-
sions which permeates the thinking of many courts,2 7 coupled with the
25. Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951).
26. But cf. Washburn v. Washburn, 5 N.H. 195 (1830) (confession of adultery
in divorce action must be corroborated). See State v. Sander, Hillsborough County,
N.H. 1950, N.Y. Times, March 10, 1950, p. 1, col. 6, discussed in 48 MiCH. L. REV.
1197 (1950), in which defendant, a doctor, was prosecuted for the murder of a
cancer patient by injecting air into her blood stream. Defendant had noted the
injection on a chart and had confessed to his nurse and later to the authorities. A
pathologist testified that death was caused by the disease rather than by the injection.
Defendant did not object that the corpus delicti had not been proved aliunde his
confession but instead permitted the case to go to the jury, which returned a verdict
of not guilty.
Conrad Danais, County Solicitor of Hillsborough County, N.H., stated in a
letter dated Dec. 27, 1954: "The policy of my office as County Solictor in seeking
indictments in cases where the only evidence that a crime was committed is the
confession of the defendant is that such cases should be nol prossed. I am of the
opinion that there must be corroboration of the crime other than the confession
of the defendant by itself." Letter on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
27. Blackstone considered confessions "the weakest and most suspicious of all
testimony, ever liable to be obtained by artifice, false hopes, promises of favor or
menaces." 4 BL. Comn. *357. See Foster, J., to the same effect in the Case of
Francis Francia (1716) discussed in 1 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 133 (1803). This
view was not universal, however. Russel felt that a confession was "the highest and
most satisfactory proof, because it is fairly presumed that no man would make such
a confession against himself, if the facts confessed were not true." 2 RusSEL,
CiRias 824 (8th Am. ed. 1857); see also RoscoE, CRImiNAL EViDENCE 28 (16th
ed. 1952).
American courts on the whole seem to have followed Blackstone's reasoning:
"The grounds on which the rule requiring independent proof of the corpus
delicti rests are the hasty and unguarded character which confessions often have,
the temptation which for one reason or another a person may have to say that which
he thinks it most for his interest to say, whether true or false. . . ." State v.
Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 1379, 44 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1950) (quoting with approval
20 Am. JUR. 1086 (1939)). See also State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 483, 214 Pac. 583,
585 (1923); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 134, 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 452, 28 A.2d 710, 713 (1942);
Mackey v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 31, 33, 234 Pac. 782, 783 (1925) ; Boyle v. State,
27 Okla. Cr. 196, 197, 226 Pac. 389, 390 (1924). "It is also true that evidence as to
confessions of parties is intrinsically weak and is inconclusive to establish a fact with-
out the aid of other testimony...." Collins v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 815, 821, 96
S.E. 826, 828 (1918).
Massachusetts has followed Russel's theory and abolished the rule, claiming there
are sufficient safeguards against involuntary confessions and innocent people do not
voluntarily confess to crimes which they have not committed. Commonwealth v.
Killon, 194 Mass. 153, 155, 80 N.E. 222, 223 (1907). The Missouri Supreme Court
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extreme difficulty that the defendant would have disproving his confes-
sion once it had been introduced in evidence. 28 This distrust stems from a
number of considerations. There is always the danger that a confession
made out of court will be misreported or misconstrued.2 9  Furthermore,
even though there are rules of evidence protecting the defendant from
confessions elicited through force or coercion, he is protected only so far
as he is able to prove that his confession was not "voluntary." Difficulty
of proof might easily make this protection inadequate,30 since usually the
only witnesses to third degree methods are the police and the defendant
himself; and it is possible for police methods to be so subtle that even if
the defendant can prove what went on in the room in the rear of the police
station, he has not shown sufficient duress to convince a court that his
confession was "involuntary." 1 Even when the police have, in fact, done
nothing to make his confession "involuntary," the defendant might think
that it is in his own best interest to make a false confession, as where the
defendant wants to be convicted and put in prison because he fears the
lynch mob,32 or where, faced with overwhelming circumstantial evidence,
the defendant confesses in the hope of obtaining a lighter sentence3 3
A further basis for distrust of confessions is the possibility that the
defendant may be mistaken in what he confesses, either as to the facts
or as to the law.34 Where the defendant confesses that he murdered the
"deceased" by hitting him on the head, it is possible that he was not in fact
killed; 35 where the defendant confesses that he murdered the "deceased"
felt that: "No definite rules can be prescribed for ascertaining the credit to be given
to confessions any more than to the evidence of witnesses. The weight to be attached
to a confession . . .must depend upon the circumstances." State v. Lamb, 28 Mo.
218, 230 (1859).
28. State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 1379, 44 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1950) ; State v.
Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 483, 214 Pac. 583, 585 (1923); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340
Pa. 128, 134, 16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940); Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super.
445, 452, 28 A.2d 710, 713 (1942) ; Mackey v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 31, 33, 234 Pac.
782, 783 (1925) ; Boyle v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. 196, 197, 226 Pac. 389, 390 (1924).
"[Confessions are] incapable in their nature of being disproved by other negative
evidence." 4 BL. Comm. *357.
29. See cases cited in note 28 supra; BEST, EVIDENCE 522 (3d Am. ed. 1908).
"Hasty confessions made to persons having no authority to examine are the
weakest and most suspicious of all evidence; words are often misreported, and ex-
tremely liable to misconstruction." People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 148, 153 (N.Y.
1836). But see Commonwealth v. Killon, 194 Mass. 153, 155, 80 N.E. 222, 223
(1907), in which the court stated that there is no greater liability to misconstrue or
misreport in the case of confessions than in any situation in which someone reports
what another has said.
30. See Smith v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 194, 197 (1954).
31. On third degree methods generally, see Note, 43 HAv. L. REV. 617 (1930).
32. See, e.g., Case of John A. Johnson (Wisconsin, 1911), in BocHAR, CoN-
vicrING THE INNOCENT 112 (1932).
33. See, e.g., Case of James Willis (California, 1927), in BoRcHARD, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 367. See also MUENST ERG, ON THE WITNEss STAND 144-45
(1923).
34. See generally BEST, EVIDENCE §§ 560-62 (3d Am. ed. 1908).
35. This possibility is discussed in WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 512 (8th
ed. 1880).
1955]
644 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
by shooting him, it is possible that the victim already was dead; 36 where
the defendant confesses that he murdered the "deceased" by throwing him
overboard near shore or near another ship, he may have survived; 3 7 or
where the defendant confesses that she smothered her illegitimate infant
as it was born, the baby may have been stillborn.38 The possibility of a
mistake of law exists in the case where a German immigrant who is unable
to speak English and who is ignorant of the difference between murder
and non-criminal homicide confesses to murder through an interpreter.3 9
However, in many types of factual situations there is no danger of mistake.
Although in a murder case the defendant might be mistaken as to whether
he killed the deceased, it is difficult to imagine a burglary case in which the
defendant could be mistaken as to whether he broke and entered the build-
ing with the intention to commit a felony.
Finally, some courts are aware that voluntary confessions are some-
times false for purely psychological reasons.40 The psychologists recognize
that there are certain mental disorders which might lead a person to think
that he actually has committed a crime which has in fact never been com-
mitted.41 The most extreme of these disorders, and the easiest to diagnose,
is a form of psychosis known as melancholia. The smallest sins of which a
psychotic of this type has actually been guilty become enormously magnified
in his mind. The last fire in town becomes an arson committed by him;
he becomes guilty of having murdered his friend who died years ago.4 One
patient who had failed to return a book to the college library had vivid
fantasies of being Jack the Ripper.4 A less extreme mental disorder,
practically impossible to diagnose, is a temporary hysterical and auto-
hypnotic abnormal state which may occur in an otherwise normal mind.44
Classic examples of this form of derangement leading to false confessions
are the cases of the Salem witches, who confessed to the crimes of which
they were accused really believing themselves to be guilty. A dissociation
of their minds set in; emotional shock caused the normal personality to go
to pieces, and a split-off second personality then began to form with its
own connected life story built up from the absurd superstitions which had
been suggested to -them through hypnotizing examinations. This type
36. This possibility is discussed in id. at 509.
37. This possibility is discussed in United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas.
No. 16,707, at 643 (C.C.D. Me. 1858).
38. This may have been the rationale of the court in State v. Johnson, 95
Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938).
39. See Gardner v. People, 106 Ill. 76 (1883); see also BEST, EVIDENCE § 562
(3d Am. ed. 1908).
40. See Smith v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 194, 197 (1954); State v. Long,
1 Hay. (2 N.C.) 455, 456 (Super. Ct. 1797).
41. Much of the following discussion is based on MUENSTMBERG, ON THE WIT-
NESS STAND 148-49 (1923).
42. Ibid. See also Bur, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 173-74 (1931).
43. Lorand, Crime in Fantasy and Dreams and the Neurotic Criminal, 17
PSYCHOANALYTIC Ray. 183, 186 (1930).
44. MUNSTME rG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 149 (1923).
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of confession is given with real conviction under the pressure of emotional
excitement or under the spell 'of overpowering influences. Even mere
fatigue, the loosening of the mental firmness and the intrusion of the sug-
gestion of guilt from long periods of questioning might lead to such false
confessions. The reports of the Salem witch trials agree that once the
accused decided to confess they fabricated their stories with ingenious facts
to make them tally with the statements of their accusers, adding points that
gave the stories an air of truthfulness.
45
In an Illinois case 46 the defendant confessed to burglary one day after
he had been adjudicated insane in a prosecution for a previous crime. The
court held that this confession was inadmissible since not made voluntarily.
"An insane person can commit no rational, voluntary act. He can do
nothing intentionally. Neither can he know of his constitutional right. His
confession is a nullity." 47 On the other hand, California has held that the
confession is admissible along with evidence that the defendant was insane
at the time he confessed, and the jury is to be instructed that it can dis-
regard the confession if it finds the defendant mentally incompetent.S In
any case it seems that in the absence of total insanity the confession is
admissible, and evidence of the defendant's mental inability goes merely
to the weight to be given the confession.
49
In view of the observations of the psychologists, even the Illinois rule
on admissibility of confessions by insane people would seem insufficient
to protect the defendant for several reasons. First, the defendant must be
examined within a reasonable period of the making of the confession or
testimony as to his sanity at that time will be of little validity. Second,
assuming that he was examined and thought to be insane by the doctors,
if there is contradictory evidence the jury is allowed to find the defendant
sane. In the California case mentioned above, the jury believed the defend-
ant to be sane in the face of testimony by four psychiatrists and some lay
witnesses that the defendant was insane. Rarely will the defendant have
been adjudicated insane before he confesses. Finally, as illustrated by the
confessions in the Salem witch trials, a mental disorder need not rise to the
height of total insanity to result in a person's believing himself guilty of a
crime which was never committed. This belief might be the result of a
temporary derangement of an otherwise perfectly normal mind. Even if
the defendant could prove that this temporary disorder had existed at
the time he confessed, under the present rules of evidence his confession
would be admissible and he would be confronted with the almost insur-
mountable task of convincing the jury that, because of a psychological state
45. Id. at 146, 149.
46. People v. Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324, 168 N.E. 336 (1929). See also State v.
Campbell, 301 Mo. 618, 257 S.W. 131 (1923).
47. People v. Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324, 326, 168 N.E. 336 (1929).
48. People v. Rucker, 11 Cal. App.2d 609, 54 P.2d 508 (1936).
49. McAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
643 (1940) ; Vinzant v. State, 28 Ala. App. 220, 180 So. 736 (1938).
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which it is difficult for the average layman to understand, his confession
is false.50
A second major factor underlying the corpus delicti rule is the shock
to the consciences of the courts which results from cases in which the
"deceased" returns alive after his supposed murderer has been tried and
convicted, and in some instances executed.51 The case of the Boom
brothers in Vermont in 1812,52 for instance, had a marked effect on the
courts of this country.5r Russel Colvin, the defendants' brother-in-law,
had the peculiar habit of disappearing, sometimes for as long as eight or
nine months, and therefore his disappearance in the spring of 1812 was
hardly noticed at first. But a series of events led to the supposition that he
had been murdered. An old dilapidated hat identified as having been worn
by Colvin when last seen was found close to the place where he had
been seen in a heated quarrel with the Boom brothers. A repeated dream
of the defendants' uncle in which Colvin related how he had been murdered
by the defendants did much to stir the countryside. A button and knife
said to be Colvin's were found in the place in which, according to the
uncle's dream, Colvin had said he had been buried. The defendants' barn
burned and it was rumored that the burning was to conceal evidence of
the murder. Some bones were unearthed by a dog and were summarily
pronounced to be human, but were later found to be an animal's. By this
time seven years had passed since the disappearance, and there was still no
definite evidence of murder. But shortly thereafter Jesse Boorn made a
statement accusing his brother of the murder; still no body was found.
Both brothers were arrested and before trial each made a confession of
the murder. They were tried, convicted and sentenced to be hanged.
Within two months of the day set for execution a newspaper advertisement
led to the discovery of Colvin, who had been living in New Jersey under
50. See note 28 supra. "To recognize where the temperament ends and the ir-
responsible disturbance begins is made extremely difficult by the great breadth of the
border land region. Public opinion, and court and jury as its organs, are always
inclined to claim that whole borderland field still for the normal life and to ac-
knowledge the mental disturbance only when the disease region is entered."
MUENSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 153 (1923).
51. See Smith v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 194, 197 (1954). "The controlling
reason for the rule that the mere confession of a criminal is insufficient to sustain a
conviction arose from the fact that in some instances persons have been convicted
upon such confessions, and thereafter the supposed victim turned up alive. While
these occurrences were infrequent, they were sufficient in number to cause the courts
in the first instance, and later the legislative power, to require that such confessions
should be corroborated by extraneous evidence that the death had been occasioned
by some criminal agency so as to preclude the presumption that it happened through
accident or suicide." State v. Howard, 102 Ore. 431, 439, 203 Pac. 311, 314 (1921).
52. The Trial of Stephen and Jesse Boorn (Vermont, 1812), 6 Am. St. Trials
73 (1916) ; There is an excellent discussion of this case in BORcHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT 15 (1932).
53. The Minnesota Supreme Court in discussing the need for a rule requiring
extrinsic proof of the corpus delicti, cited the unfortunate conviction in the Boom-
case. State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368, 376 (1860). The case is also cited in 1
GREENLEAF, EvIDENcE 256-57 n.2 (2d ed. 1844), and in WHARTON, CRIMINAL Evi-
DEN CE 512 n.1 (8th ed. 1880), which texts led to the establishment of the rule by at
least two courts. See note 18 supra. Wharton also cites a similar case involving the
Trailor Brothers, Illinois, 1841. Ibid.
PROOF OF THE CORPUS DELICTI
an assumed name. Requiring proof of the corpus delicti independent of the
defendant's confession seems to be the logical method of preventing con-
victions like that in the Boorm case.
Third, some courts explain the need for the rule in terms very similar
to the "best evidence rule." For example, the best way to prove that
there has been a death and to ascertain its cause is by finding and inspecting
the body, but, where this is shown to be impossible because the body has
been destroyed or is inaccessible, circumstantial evidence may suffice.
54
Similarly, the best way to prove a robbery is by having the victim testify.55
Courts which follow this line of reasoning as a general proposition classify
confessions as inferior to both direct and circumstantial evidence of the
crime. In some situations, however, the best evidence of at least part of
the corpus delicti would be the defendant's confession, as for example, the
scienter in transporting a car across the state line knowing it to be stolen.
The fourth factor is the apparent desire of some courts to force the
prosecution to produce as much evidence of the crime as it is possible to
gather, instead of permitting reliance on the defendant's confession alone.56
Two early New York cases illustrate this reasoning. In the first of these
the court, in reversing a conviction of embezzlement based solely on the
defendant's confession, said:
"The truth is, no court will ever rely upon the confessions alone,
when it is apparent that there is evidence aliunde to prove that an
offense has been committed. In the case now before us, it was
manifest that there were witnesses not before the court who could
have given material testimony to prove the facts essential to the body
of the offense." "
In the second case the same court affirmed a conviction of forgery, dis-
tinguishing the earlier opinion on the ground that in the former case the
defrauded victims were available to testify but had not been called, while
in the case at bar the alleged maker of the promissory note in question
had not been called because he had died before trial. "The highest and
best evidence in the power of the prosecutor was produced .... " 58
The last and most nebulous of all the factors is the adverse emotional
reaction of the courts to a conviction in which the only evidence adduced
is the confession of the accused, especially where the defendant has re-
pudiated his confession. Often cited in support of the rule is Greenleaf's
observation in his discussion of independent proof of the corpus delicti:
. [T]his opinion certainly best accords with the humanity of the
54. Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 744-46 (1879) (no confession involved).
55. Cf. People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 565, 572 (1867).
56. See Smith v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 194, 197 (1954).
57. People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147, 155 (N.Y. 1836); see also In re
Flodstrom, 277 P.2d 101 (Cal. App. 1954).
58. People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53, 59 (N.Y. 1836); cf. People v. Wulff, 313
Ill. 286, 145 N.E. 108 (1924).
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criminal code. . . ." " This basis for adherence to the corpus delicti
rule is somewhat similar to that which supports the right against self-
incrimination. In both instances the courts indicate a reluctance to con-
vict a person solely on the basis of his own statements, even though
he may in fact be guilty.
Some of these factors relied on in support of the corpus delicti rule,
if carried to their logical conclusions, would require independent evidence
of the whole charge, including the defendant's agency. 6° But under the
corpus delicti rule as it now exists the confession by itself is sufficient to
prove that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.6 If there is a
chance that the defendant's confession was not voluntary, the confession
should not be sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant committed the
crime any more than it should be sufficient to prove that a crime was com-
mitted. As a matter of fact, it would seem that the greatest danger that
the police will use third degree methods or that the defendant will succumb
to the suggestive influence of long hours of questioning by the police
exists where there is some independent evidence that a crime was com-
mitted, which has led the police to undertake an investigation. Likewise,
the danger of a pathological confession would be as great where the question
is who committed a crime as where the question is whether a crime was
committed. Similarly, there is no clear reason why the adverse emotional
reaction of the courts to conviction based solely on the defendant's con-
fession should be confined to his statements which tend to prove the
corpus delicti. And finally, it seems desirable that the prosecution produce
as much evidence as possible with respect to all elements of the crime, not
only with respect to the corpus delicti.
On the other hand, this reasoning for the most part is not applicable
to the other factors. It seems that courts would be shocked to a greater
degree by a case in which positive proof of a false conviction turns up in
the form of a person supposed to have been murdered, than by a case in
which a person other than the convicted defendant was later shown to be
the criminal. And, although the best way to prove that a crime was com-
mitted is by direct or circumstantial evidence rather than by the confes-
sion of the defendant, the confession would rate higher on the scale of proof
as evidence that the defendant committed the crime. Similarly, the danger
that the defendant might be mistaken about the occurrence as to which he
confessed lies usually in the possibility that he was mistaken as to whether
a crime was committed. If that is established, there is almost no danger
that the defendant was mistaken as to whether he was the person who
59. 1 GREENLEAF, EviDENcE 260 (2d ed. 1844), cited in State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn.
61. See note 63 infra.
368, 376 (1860) ; State v. Dena, 28 N.M. 479, 483, 214 Pac. 583, 585 (1923) ; Mackey
v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 31, 33, 234 Pac. 782, 783 (1925); Boyle v. State, 27 Okla.
Cr. 196, 197, 226 Pac. 389, 390 (1924) ; Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 134,
16 A.2d 401, 404 (1940); Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 452, 28
A.2d 710, 713 (1942).
60. See text at note 70 infra.
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committed the criminal act. An exception to this proposition would be the
rather unlikely case where the defendant and someone else shoot at the
deceased simultaneously, and the defendant's bullet strikes the deceased
after he has been killed by the other.
To the extent that there is a conflict between the logic behind the vari-
ous theories and the limitation of the requirement of independent evidence
to proof of the corpus delicti, the present rule seems almost to be a com-
promise between two extremes: requiring proof of all elements of the crime
independent of the confession, or requiring no independent evidence at all.
The former alternative would undoubtedly make it almost impossible to
obtain convictions in many cases where the defendant is guilty; the latter
would afford no protection whatsoever to the individuals who would be
wrongly convicted.
DEFINITION OF CoRpus DELICTI 
6 2
Today, every jurisdiction in the United States which has a rule
requiring proof of the corpus delicti aliunde the defendant's confession
defines corpus delicti as including the first two elements of the crime, i.e.,
the injury and the criminality. Although the North Dakota Supreme
62. "The use of Latin words, e.g. "corpus delicti," "res gestae" and the like, in
the law of evidence, do [sic] not tend to throw much light upon the subject. Not infre-
quently one feels justified in suspecting that when a judge says evidence is admissible
because it is part of the "res gestae," or says a confession is not admissible because
the "corpus delicti" has not been proved, the judge has a hunch it should be ad-
missible or inadmissible, as the case may be, and resorts to a foreign language he
doesn't understand for a reason." Ritter, J., in Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d
945, 946 (10th Cir. 1954).
Often the layman thinks of the corpus delicti as the body of the dead person in
a murder case. Perhaps the cause of such thinking can be found in the following
statements: "The finding of a dead body establishes only the corpus. The finding
of such body under circumstances that indicate a crime would indicate the delicti
or felonious killing." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 325 (10th ed. 1912).
"While it [the corpus delicti] is generally defined as the body of a crime, it is more
clearly expressed by calling it the body or thing which is the victim of a wrong.
The body of a man produced under circumstances that show a felony is corpus delicti
in homicide." Id. § 325 n.4.
63. ALAAA: Peoples v. State, 256 Ala. 612, 56 So.2d 665 (1952) ; Phillips v.
State, 248 Ala. 510, 28 So.2d 542 (1946); Daniels v. State, 12 Ala. App. 119, 68
So. 499 (1915). ARIZONA: State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P.2d 91 (1941).
ARKANSAS: ARE. STAT. ANN. § 43-2115 (1947); Ezell v. State, 217 Ark. 94, 229
S.W.2d 32 (1950) ; Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720 (1879). C~ALnoRNA: People v.
Holman, 72 Cal. App.2d 75, 164 P2d 297 (1945) ; People v. Sameniego, 118 Cal. App.
165, 4 P2d 809 (1931); People v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 Pac. 896 (1896).
CoNEcriCUT: State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A2d 429 (1950). DEA-
wARn: State v. Galvano, 34 Del. (4 Harring) 409, 154 AtI. 461 (Ct Oyer & Ter.
1930). FLORIDA: McElveen v. State, 72 So2d 785 (Fla. 1954) ; Holland v. State,
39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897). GEORGIA: McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E2d
462 (1949) ; Clay v. State, 176 Ga. 403, 168 S.E. 289 (1933). IDAHo: State v. Keller,
8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902). ILLINOIS: People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 77
N.E2d 164 (1948) ; People v. Harrison, 261 Ill. 517, 104 N.E. 259 (1914). INDIANA:
Dennis v. State, 230 Ind. 210, 102 N.E.2d 650 (1952); Parker v. State, 228 Ind.
1, 88 N.E2d 556 (1949), rehearig denied, 228 Ind. 11, 89 N.E2d 442 (1950). IowA:
IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.7 (1946). KENTUCKY: Ky. CODES, CRnM. PRAC. § 240 (1948) ;
Warmke v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 649, 180 S.W2d 872 (1944). LouIsI.XA:
State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925). MAINE: State v. Levesque, 146
Me. 351, 81 A.2d 665 (1951). MARYLAND: Weller v. State, 150 Md. 278, 132 At.
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Court defines corpus delicti as including both the injury and the crim-
inality, 4 it requires independent proof of the injury only, on the basis of a
statute which says:
"In a prosecution for murder, manslaughter, or aiding suicide . . . a
confession or admission of the accused . . . shall not be admissible
to establish the death of the person alleged to have been killed." 6
624 (1926). MIcaIGAlx: People v. Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949);
People v. Mondich, 234 Mich. 590, 208 N.W. 675 (1926). MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 634.03 (West 1945); State v. Grear, 29 Minn. 221, 13 N.W. 140 (1882);
State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368 (1860). Mxssissn'pi: Rogers v. State, 76 So.2d
831 (Miss. 1955); Buford v. State, 69 So.2d 826 (Miss. 1954) ; Garner v. State, 132
Miss. 815, 96 So. 743 (1923); Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472 (1870). MissouRI:
State v. Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S.W.2d 701 (1943); State v. Hawkins, 165
S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1942); State v. Garrison, 342 Mo. 453, 116 S.W.2d 23 (1938).
MONTANA: State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont. 9, 105 P.2d 679 (1940). NEBRASKA:
Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950). NEVADA: State v. Fouquette,
67 Nev. 505, 221 P2d 404 (1950). NEw MaxIcO: State v. Jones, 52 N.M. 118, 192
P.2d 559 (1948). NEw YORK: N.Y. CODE Cimt. PROC. § 395; People v. Deacons,
109 N.Y. 374, 16 N.E. 676 (1888). NORTH CAROLINA: State v. Cope, 81 S.E.2d
773 (N.C. 1954). OHIO: State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916) ;
State v. Arnold, 63 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945). OKLAHOMA: Brown v.
State, 274 P.2d 779 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954) ; Ridinger v. State, 267 P.2d 175 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1953); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Cr. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952); Osborn
v. State, 86 Okla. Cr. 259, 194 P.2d 176 (1948) ; Choate v. State, 12 Okla. Cr. 560,
160 Pac. 34 (1916). OREoN: ORE. CoMp. LAws ANN. §26-937 (1940); State v.
Henderson, 182 Ore. 147, 184 P.2d 392 (1947); State v. Elwell, 105 Ore. 282, 209
Pac. 616 (1922); State v. Weston, 102 Ore. 102, 201 Pac. 1083 (1921); State v.
Rogoway, 45 Ore. 601, 78 Pac. 987 (1904), reversed on other grounds at rehearing,
45 Ore. 611, 81 Pac. 234 (1905). PENNSYLVANIA: Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346
Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943); Commonwealth v. Danarowicz, 294 Pa. 190, 144 At.
127 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 Atl. 401 (1923) ; Gray v.
Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882); Commonwealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35,
98 A.2d 221 (1953); Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 28 A.2d 710
(1942). RHODE ISLAND: State v. Boswell, 73 R.I. 358, 56 A.2d 196 (1947) ; State
v. Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259, 43 Atl. 31 (1899). SOuTH CAROLINA: State v. Thomas,
222 S.C. 484, 73 S.E.2d 722 (1952). TENzNssEE: Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn.
670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951); Ashby v.
State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911). TExAS: McDaniel v. State, 144 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 168, 161 S.W.2d 1064 (1942); Lott v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. Rep. 366,
148 S.W.2d 1102 (1941); Estes v. State, 274 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1955). UTAH: State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P2d 1010 (1938). VERMuONT:
State v. Longe, 96 Vt. 7, 116 At. 81 (1922). WASHINGrON: State v. Lutes, 3&
Wash.2d 475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d 759, 226 P.2d 204
(1951); State v. Van Brunt, 22 Wash.2d 103, 154 P.2d 606 (1944). VIRGINIA:
Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 665, 66 S.E.2d 605 (1951); Collins v. Common-
wealth, 123 Va. 815, 96 S.E. 826 (1918). WEST VIRGINIA: cf. State v. Harrison,
98 W. Va. 227, 127 S.E. 55 (1925); State v. Merrill, 72 W. Va. 500, 78 S.E. 699
(1913). WYOMING: Dalzell v. State, 7 Wyo. 450, 53 Pac. 297 (1898). FEDERAL: 2d
Cir.: United States v. Markman, 193 F2d 574 (2d Cir. 1951). 3d Cir.: United States
v. Di Orio, 150 F.2d 938 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 771 (1945). 4th Cir.:
United States v. Washington, 69 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1946); cf. Tabor v. United
States, 152 F.2d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 1945) (cites Forte case infra with approval).
5th Cir.: Vogt v. United States, 156 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1946). 7th Cir.: cf.
United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1953) (cites Vogt case supra
with approval). 8th Cir.: Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir.
1940) (cites Forte case infra with approval). 10th Cir.: Manning v. United States,
215 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1954). D.C. Cir.: Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236
(D.C. Cir.), on certified qtestions, 302 U.S 220 (1937).
64. State v. Sogge, 36 N.D. 262, 161 N.W. 1022, 1023 (1917) (no confession
involved).
65. N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2729 (1943).
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In reviewing a conviction for murder in the second degree in which a dead
body had been found with strong evidence of suicide, the North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that his confession of
murder was not sufficient by itself to prove that the death was criminally
caused; the court ruled: "It is only the fact of death that the statute says
may not be established by the confession or admission of the accused." 66
There is some early authority in other jurisdictions for defining corpus
delicti in terms of the injury only,6 7 but these cases are not followed today.
68
In contrast, some courts had previously defined corpus delicti as composed
of all three elements of the crime, including the defendant's participation
as well as the basic injury and the criminal cause. 69 Professor Wigmore
refers to such a definition as "absurd" since it requires proof of the entire
case without utilizing the defendant's confession,70 and today no court
adheres to such a definition.71 In many crimes, however, it is very difficult
66. State v. Gibson, 69 N.D. 70, 99, 284 N.W. 209, 223 (1938). See also People
v. Mones, 59 Philippine I. 46, 56-57 (1933).
67. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,707, at 644 (C.C.D. Me.
1858) ("Where the fact of death is fully proved by other evidence, no reason is per-
ceived why the free and voluntary confession of the party, if deliberately made, may
not be sufficient to establish the other element of the corpus delicti, provided it
satisfactorily appears that other evidence does not exist.") ; Sam v. State, 33 Miss.
347, 353 (1857) ; State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33 (1879). In Ausmus v. People, 47 Colo.
167, 180-81, 107 Pac. 204, 209-10 (1909), the court expressed its preference for a
definition of corpus delicti including the injury only, but did not go so far as to base
its decision on such a definition since there was sufficient evidence of criminality in
the record. See discussion in People v. Ranney, 153 Mich. 293, 116 N.W. 999
(1908).
68. Forte, v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1937) ("We think that
this case decided in 1858 [United States v. Williams, supra note 67], does not repre-
sent the current rule upon the subject.") ; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472 (1870) (no
mention of Sam v. State, supra note 67, but held, corpus delicti of murder is death
through criminal agency) ; State v. Longe, 96 Vt. 7, 116 At. 81 (1922) (no mention
of State v. Potter, supra note 67, but held, corpus delicti of murder is death through
criminal agency).
69. MIssoURI: cf. State v. Bennett, 6 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Mo. 1928); State v.
Joy, 315 Mo. 7, 285 S.W. 489 (1926) (No confession involved. The concurring
opinion, however, discusses the effect of such a definition on cases involving con-
fessions. Id. at 19, 285 S.W. at 494.) Wigmore cites these two cases as standing
for the three-element definition of corpus delicti. 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 402-03,
n.4 (3d ed. 1940). In State v. Hawkins, 165 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Mo. 1942), the court
said: "[These cases] . . . do not add the third requirement, as Professor Wigmore
suggests, of proof of the accused's identity or agency as the criminal. True the state-
ment is made by the judge who wrote the opinion but in each instance the other two
judges of the division specifically did not concur in that statement."
OHIO: State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 94, 104-05 (1890) (cites WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 325 (8th ed. 1880), which says that the corpus delicti consists
of "(1) a criminal act; and (2) the defendant's agency in the production of such
act"). Contra: State v. Wehr, 6 Ohio N.P. 345 (1899) (points out that later edi-
tions of WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE say corpus delicti does not include defend-
ant's agency). OREGON: See State v. Howard, 102 Ore. 431, 440, 203 Pac. 311, 314
(1921) (even if corpus delicti were considered to include defendant's agency, there is
sufficient independent evidence thereof). Contra: State v. Henderson, 184 P.2d
392 (Ore. 1947). TEXAS: Ellison v. State, 59 Tex. Crim. Rep. 3, 127 S.W. 542
(1910) ; Josef v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 446, 30 S.W. 1067 (1895) (no confession
involved). Contra: Watson v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. Rep. 438, 227 S.W.2d 559
(1950).
70. 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2072(3) (3d ed. 1940). But see text following note
60 supra.
71. See text at note 63 and note 63 supra.
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to prove the corpus delicti without connecting the defendant with the
crime. Among these would be drunken driving,72 illegal use of narcotics,
any offense involving fraud, such as tax evasion,73 and any offense of which
scienter is an element, such as transporting a car across a state line knowing
it to be stolen 74 or knowingly permitting the consumption of intoxicating
beverages in one's restaurant without a license.7" But merely because proof
of the corpus delicti, in effect, involves proof of the whole charge, the
prosecution is not relieved from proving the corpus delicti aliunde the
confession.
76
There are many detailed elements of the prosecution's case which do
not fit clearly into any of the categories of injury, criminality or defendant's
agency. Whether these elements should be included in the corpus delicti
and thus be included within the requirement of independent proof is a
problem which has been troublesome in many cases. On the one hand, the
courts do not want to deprive the defendant of the protection of the rule
requiring independent proof of the crime, and, on the other hand, they do
not want to make it impossible for the prosecution to prove its case.
There is some disagreement in the language of the decisions as to
whether the identity of the deceased in a murder prosecution must be proved
as part of the corpus delicti, aliunde the confession.7 7  No case has been
found, however, the result of which has turned on the difference between
the rules which the courts have enunciated. Obviously, the independent
proof, in order to add anything to the confession, must be of the particular
murder to which the defendant has confessed.78  The following examples
will illustrate the different ways in which the independent proof of the
corpus delicti may be linked to the defendant's confession.
(1) The defendant confesses that he murdered John Smith, and a
dead body is found which witnesses examine and identify as John Smith.
This is the most satisfactory means of identification.
72. State v. Jones, 108 A.2d 261 (Me. 1954).
73. Smith v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 194, 198 (1954).
74. Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1954); Forte v. United
States, 94 F.2d 236, 244 (D.C. Cir.), m certified questions, 302 U.S. 220 (1937).
75. State v. Carter, 275 P2d 847 (N.M. 1954).
76. See cases cited in notes 72-75 supra.
77. The following cases support the rule that identification of the deceased is
part of the corpus delicti: Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 746-47 (1879) ; Wall v.
State, 5 Ga. App. 305, 63 S.E. 27 (1908); Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d
556 (1949), rehearing denied, 228 Ind. 1, 89 N.E.2d 442 (1950); State v. Weston,
102 Ore. 102, 118, 201 Pac. 1083, 1088 (1921); cf. State v. Howard, 102 Ore. 431,
203 Pac. 311 (1921) (conviction of assault reversed since victim not identified
aliunde).
The following cases support the rule that identification of the deceased is not
part of the corpus delicti: People v. Mondich, 234 Mich. 590, 208 N.W. 675 (1926)
(slight evidence of identity present); see Smith v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 809,
818-19 (Va. 1871) (If defendant's confession is to be relied upon to prove identity, it
ought to be certain that what he said was intended to be an admission that the body
found was the same child who was delivered to him.) ; cf. State v. Riggs, 61 Mont.
25, 201 Pac. 272 (1921). See also 1 WHAIRToN, CRimiNAL. EviDENc § 325 (10th ed.
1912).
78. Accord, State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 308 (1860).
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(2) The defendant confesses that he murdered John Smith, and a
dead body is found whose features are unrecognizable because of decomposi-
tion or destruction. Witnesses are able to recognize the clothes, teeth or
hair of the deceased as those of John Smith. Where necessary, identifica-
tion by such circumstantial evidence is allowed even in cases where there
is no confession.7
9
(3) The defendant confesses that he murdered John Smith and buried
him in a particular place in the woods. The police follow the directions
of the defendant and find an unrecognizable body at that place. Proof of
the deceased's name independent of the confession in this case should be
unnecessary, since the fact that a body was found at the place the defendant
described eliminates all but the slightest possibility that the body was not
that of the defendant's victim. In contrast, if the defendant confessed that
he had drowned his victim in a river and an unidentifiable body was found
in the same river, there would not be sufficient identification of the deceased
as the defendant's victim. It would be possible that the body was that of
another person and that the defendant was mistaken in thinking that he
had killed his victim; or it would be possible that the defendant had made a
pathological confession. In either case the chance of coincidence in finding
the body in the river is much greater than in. finding the body in a secluded
grave in a particular place in the woods.
(4) The defendant confesses that he murdered John Smith by shoot-
ing him three times in the back of the head, and an unrecognizable body is
found with three bullet holes in the back of its head. In this case it should
not be necessary to prove the name of the deceased aliunde the confession.
The matching of the wounds on the body with the wounds that the defendant
said he had inflicted on his victim is sufficient identification. As a practical
matter, the police often reduce the danger of a false confession even more
in cases similar to this by asking the confessor why he inflicted on the
deceased several different types of wounds which in fact do not exist.s ° A
person who is determined for some reason to make a false confession is
likely to admit having inflicted such wounds.
Courts generally have said that the manner in which the deceased was
killed need not be proved aliunde the confession.8 ' But it would seem that
such proof is essential to the extent necessary to show that the particular
murder to which the defendant has confessed was committed, or to the
extent necessary to show that the death of the deceased was criminally
caused. In a case in which a skeleton is found buried in a shallow grave in
a thicket, with no marker, and with lime in the grave, adequate proof of
criminality aliunde the confession requires evidence of the manner in which
79. McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949); Gray v. Common-
wealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882); Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 747 (1879).
80. See letter from James P. Kellstedt, State's Attorney, Peoria, Illinois, dated
Jan. 3, 1955, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
81. McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 340, 53 S.E.2d 462, 471 (1949); State v.
Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 71 N.E. 705 (1904); State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 94
(1890).
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the deceased was killed. However, on these facts the Georgia Supreme
Court inferred criminality from the apparent attempt to conceal the body.82
When a body is found with a crushed skull, proof that death was caused by
a hammer rather than a hatchet would not necessarily be important, but
proof that death was caused by a hammer rather than an automobile would
be important.
A Delaware court has held that independent proof of malice afore-
thought is not requisite to conviction.8 It would seem that better proof
of the defendant's state of mind than his confession could not be offered, and
to require additional evidence would impose an onerous burden on the
prosecution, making conviction impossible in many cases in which the
defendant is guilty. On the other hand, fear that the defendant was un-
aware, when he confessed to murder, of the legal distinction between murder
and lesser types of homicide,8 4 would motivate a court to require inde-
pendent proof of malice aforethought.
On the whole, the courts have not been very receptive to arguments
that various detailed points must be proved independently. Conviction of
adultery was affirmed in a case in which the defendant at trial denied only
that part of his confession which stated that the adultery had been com-
mitted in the state in which he was being tried, and then argued that he
could not be convicted unless jurisdiction was proved independently of
his confession. The court pointed out that the purpose of the rule requir-
ing extrinsic evidence of the crime was to prevent conviction for a crime
which had not been committed, and that proof of jurisdiction would not
further that purpose s 5 Similarly, in a case in which an Indian was being
prosecuted for the murder of a white man, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the fact that the burned body which had been found was
that of a white man need not be proved as part of the corpus delicti inde-
pendently of the defendant's statements, since the race of the deceased was
material only to the question of jurisdiction and not to the question of
whether a crime had been committed.
8 6
Some of the detailed elements over which the courts struggle, how-
ever, are clearly requisite to the proof of either the basic injury or of
criminality, and, therefore, should be included in the corpus delicti. For
example, where the defendant confesses that he stole certain goods which
are found in his possession, proof that the goods are missing from the
victim's possession is essential to proof of the basic injury of larceny, and
82. McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E2d 462 (1949).
83. State v. Galvana, 34 Del. (4 Harring) 409, 154 Atl. 461 (Ct. Oyer & Ter.
1930).
84. See text at note 39 spra.
85. See Commonwealth v. Dolph, 164 Pa. Super. 415, 420, 65 A.2d 253, 255
(1949) ; see also Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301 (1926).
86. Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.S. 487 (1895). There was no identification
problem in this case. In a case where such a problem did exist, however, the race
of the deceased might be relevant to prove whether a crime had been committed.
See text at and following note 77 supra.
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therefore should be included in the corpus delicti.8 7  Proof of the crime of
conspiracy, unlike the proof of most crimes, is not clearly dissectible into
the three main elements, but the agreement is basic to the injury and, there-
fore, should be included in the corpus delicti.88 Proof of the penetration in
sodomy, 9 of the felony in felony murder,9° of the scienter in transporting a
stolen car across the state line knowing it to be stolen,9' of the intention to
commit a felony in burglary,92 of the intention to steal at the time pos-
session was obtained in larceny by trick,93 and of the operation of a truck
at a negligent rate of speed in manslaughter 9 4 are all essential to proof of
criminality and, therefore, should be included in the corpus delicti. In
Illinois, in order to constitute statutory rape the prosecutrix must be under
sixteen and the defendant over seventeen.9 5 The Illinois Supreme Court
correctly held that the age of the defendant is part of the corpus delicti of
statutory rape, but it misapplied the rule, holding that the defendant's
appearance was not sufficient proof of his age since it could not be preserved
in the record for review by the appellate court.96 This might make sense
where there is a close question as to the defendant's age, but in this case
the defendant had confessed that he was thirty-five.
At least two courts have held that those details which merely increase
the degree of the crime are not included in the corpus delicti, while those
details which make otherwise non-criminal actions criminal are included.
9 7
Accordingly, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the fact that the theft
was in the night time was not part of the corpus delicti of larceny in the
night time, 8 and in another case said that the fact that the theft was from a
dwelling house was not part of the corpus delicti of larceny from a dwelling
house.9 This rule would be of greater aid to the prosecution in the first
type of case than in the second, for ordinarily it would be easier to prove
that goods were stolen from a particular place than to prove that they were
stolen at a particular time.
87. Accord, People v. Maruda, 314 Ill. 536, 145 N.E. 696 (1924); Common-
wealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
88. Accord, Tingle v. United States, 38 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1930); Short v.
People, 27 Colo. 175, 60 Pac. 350 (1900).
89. Accord, United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1954).
90. Accord, People v. Giusto, 206 N.Y. 67, 99 N.E. 190 (1912). But cf. State v.
Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 94 (1890).
91. Accord, Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1954) ; United
States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236
(D.C. Cir. 1937); Whitehead v. State, 16 Ala. App. 427, 78 So. 467 (1918).
92. Accord, Brown v. State, 85 Miss. 27, 37 So. 497 (1904).
93. Accord, State v. Blay, 77 Vt. 56, 58 Atl. 794 (1904).
94. Accord, Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
95. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §490 (1934).
96. People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953).
97. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir.), on certified questions,
302 U.S. 220 (1937); State v. McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 39 S.W.2d 523 (1931).
98. State v. McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 39 S.W.2d 523 (1931).
99. State v. Flowers, 311 Mo. 510, 278 S.W. 1040 (1925).
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INDEPENDENT PROOF OF THE CoRPUs DELICTI
Most jurisdictions require independent proof of the corpus delicti; :10
this gives rise to three main problems: (1) Must each element of the
corpus delicti be independently proved? If not, to what extent may the
confession be used? (2) What quantum of independent proof is required?
and (3) How significant is the charge to the jury?
Extent to Which Proof of the Corpus Delicti Must Be Independent
of the Confession
Some courts require that proof of the corpus delicti be completely in-
dependent of the defendant's confession, 10 1 while others allow the confes-
sion to be used to fill in gaps in the independent proof by lending significance
to otherwise unimportant facts.-02 For example: X's body was found
100. See cases cited in notes 101, 102 infra.
101. ALABAMA: Hines v. State, 260 Ala. 668, 72 So2d 296 (1954); Peoples v.
State, 256 Ala. 612, 56 So.2d 665 (1952); Rutland v. State, 31 Ala. App. 43, 11
So2d 768 (1943); Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657 (1919). CALI-
FORNIA: People v. Kinder, 122 Cal. App.2d 457, 265 P.2d 24 (1954); People v.
Holman, 72 Cal. App.2d 75, 164 P.2d 297 (1945); People v. Monks, 133 Cal. App.
440, 24 P.2d 508 (1933); People v. Hayes, 72 Cal. App. 292, 301, 237 Pac. 390,
394 (1925). CONNECTICUT: State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429
(1950). Contra: State v. La Louche, 116 Conn. 691, 166 At. 252 (1933). FLORIDA:
McElveen v. State, 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105
So. 130 (1925) ; Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897). GEORGIA: Grimes
v. State, 204 Ga. 854, 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949); Clay v. State, 176 Ga. 403, 168 S.E.
289 (1933); Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E.2d 302 (1949). Contra:
Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944). INDIANA: Dennis v. State, 230
Ind. 210, 102 N.E.2d 650 (1952) ; Parker v. State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949),
rehearing denied, 89 N.E.2d 442 (1950). MAINE: State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 276,
92 A.2d 327 (1952) ; State v. Hoffses, 147 Me. 221, 85 A.2d 919 (1952). MIcHIGAN:
People v. Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949). MississIppi: Pope v.
State, 158 Miss. 794, 131 So. 264 (1930). MONTANA: State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont.
9, 105 P.2d 679 (1940). NEW MExico: State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d
325 (1952). But see State v. Chaves, 27 N.M. 504, 507, 202 Pac. 694, 695 (1921)
(The court said that there was sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti without
reference to the confession; therefore, it was unnecessary to determine whether the
confession could have been used as an aid in proving it.). OKLAHOMA: Osborn v.
State, 86 Okla. Cr. 259, 194 P.2d 176 (1948). PENNSYLVANIA: Commonwealth v.
Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 Atl. 657 (1926) ; Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882) ;
Commonwealth v. Du Hadway, 175 Pa. Super. 201, 103 A.2d 489 (1954). SOUTH
CAROLINA: State v. Thomas, 222 S.C. 484, 73 S.E.2d 722 (1952) ; State v. Miller,
211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23 (1947). TENNESSEE: Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670,
235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951); Ashby v. State, 124
Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911). FEDERAL: United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531
(7th Cir. 1953) ; Tingle v. United States, 38 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Manning v.
United States, 215 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236
(D.C. Cir.), on certified questions, 302 U.S. 220 (1937); cf. Smith v. United States,
75 Sup. Ct. 194 (1954).
102. ARKANSAS: Mouser v. State, 216 Ark. 965, 228 S.W.2d 472 (1950); Hall
v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189 S.W.2d 917 (1945); Hubbard v. State, 77 Ark. 126,
91 S.W. 11 (1905); Misenheimer v. State, 73 Ark. 407, 84 S.W. 494 (1904).
DELAWARE: State v. Kehm, 103 A.2d 781 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954). IDAHO: State v.
Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902). ILLINOIS: People v. Gavurnik, 2 Ill.2d
190, 117 N.E.2d 782 (1954) ; People v. Harrison, 261 II1. 517, 104 N.E. 259 (1914).
IOWA: State v. Wescott, 130 Iowa 1, 104 N.W. 341 (1905). MARYLAND: Davis v.
State, 202 Md. 463, 97 A.2d 303 (1953). MINNESOTA: State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn.
368 (1860). MIssouRI: State v. Knowles, 185 Mo. 141, 83 S.W. 1083 (1904).
NEBRASKA: Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950). NEVADA: In re
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buried in an obscure place, and the defendant confessed that he had mur-
dered him, describing in detail the way in which X had been buried. A
blood stain was found on the floor where the defendant said that he had
beaten X to death. This was held to be sufficient evidence of the corpus
delicti when considered in connection with the confession. 1 3  However,
discounting the confession, there would not be sufficient evidence of the
corpus delicti. The blood stain on the floor is of little significance without
the defendant's confession that he beat the deceased to death at that place.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in rejecting the idea that the confession be
used to help prove the corpus delicti, said: "To accept the existence of facts
drawn from a confession to be the basis of the corpus delicti would be to let
a portion of the confession corroborate itself." a04 But in every jurisdiction,
with the exception of Pennsylvania,10 5 the confession may be used at least
as cumulative evidence of the corpus delicti, 0 6 i.e., once sufficient inde-
pendent evidence of the corpus delicti has been introduced, the confession
may be added thereto to help convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the crime has been committed. Although most courts say that inde-
pendent proof of the corpus delicti should precede the introduction of the
confession, 10 7 a reversal of the order of proof, provided sufficient inde-
Kelley, 28 Nev. 491, 83 Pac. 223 (1905). NEW YORK: People v. Badgley, 16 Wend.
53 (N.Y. 1836). OHIO: State v. Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 71 N.E. 705 (1904).
RHODE ISLAND: State v. Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259, 43 Atl. 31 (1899). TEXAS: Sims v.
State, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 570, 239 S.W. 1116 (1922); Ingram v. State, 78 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 559, 182 S.W. 290 (1916). VIRGINIA: Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 192
Va. 665, 66 S.E.2d 605 (1951); Cleek v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 697, 181 S.E.
359 (1935). WASHINToN: State v. Van Brunt, 22 Wash,2d 103, 154 P.2d 606
(1944); State v. Scott, 86 Wash. 296, 150 Pac. 423 (1915). WEST VIRGINIA:
State v. Blackwell, 10Z W. Va. 421, 135 S.E. 393 (1926) ; State v. Hall, 31 W. Va.
505, 7 S.E. 422 (1888). WYOMING: Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 76 Pac. 577
(1904). FEDERAL: Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 930 (1951); Vogt v. United States, 156 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1946); cf.
Opper v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 158 (1954).
103. Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950).
104. Clay v. State, 176 Ga. 403, 405, 168 S.E. 289, 290 (1933). This case was
specifically overruled on this point by Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 675, 32 S.E.2d
397, 399 (1944), but Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E.2d 302 (1949), ap-
parently cited the Logue case for the very proposition which that case had supposedly
overruled.
105. See text at and following note 192 infra.
106. Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), on certified questions, 302
U.S. 220 (1937); People v. Roganovich, 77. Cal. App. 158, 246 Pac. 132 (1926);
McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949) ; State v. Carleton, 148 Me.
237, 92 A.2d 327 (1952); State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont. 9, 105 P.2d 679 (1940);
Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911); State v. Lutes, 38 Wash.2d
475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951). See also cases cited in notes 113-15 infra, from which this
proposition can be implied.
107. ALABAMA: Hines v. State, 260 Ala. 668, 72 So.2d 296 (1954); Peoples v.
State, 256 Ala. 612, 56 So.2d 665 (1952); Rutland v. State, 31 Ala. App. 43, 11
So.2d 768 (1943) ; Daniels v. State, 12 Ala. App. 119, 68 So. 499 (1915) ; Granison
v. State, 117 Ala. 22, 23 So. 146 (1898). ARIZONA: State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174,
185 P.2d 757 (1947). CALrFoRNIA: People v. Kinder, 122 Cal. App.2d 457, 265
P.2d 24 (1954) ; People v. Holman, 72 Cal. App.2d 75, 164 P.2d 297 (1945) ; People
v. Monks, 133 Cal. App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (1933); People v. Hayes, 72 Cal. App.
292, 237 Pac. 390 (1925) ; People v. Swaile, 12 Cal. App. 192, 107 Pac. 134 (1909).
CoN EcrICUT: State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429 (1950). FLORIDA:
McElveen v. State, 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105
So. 130 (1925); Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897). GEORGIA:
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pendent proof is introduced at some point, does not constitute reversible
error.
108
There are certain dangers inherent in a rule which permits the con-
fession to be used to help prove the corpus delicti. One psychologist main-
tains that knowledge of a confession produces powerful suggestive in-
fluences for judges, witnesses, experts, and all concerned in the case. The
human mind is so inclined to adapt everything perceived to some given
explanation that it strains for an explanation and trims facts until they fit
easily into that explanation.
"We hear of a certain crime and consider the earliest data. For one
reason or another we begin to suspect A as the criminal. The result
of an examination of the premises is applied in each detail to this
proposition. It fits. So does the autopsy, so do the depositions of wit-
nesses. Everything fits. There have indeed been difficulties, but they
have been set aside, they are attributed to inaccurate observation and
the like,--the point is,--that this evidence is against A. Now, sup-
pose that B confesses the crime; this event is so significant that it sets
aside at once all the earlier reasons for suspecting A, and the theory
of the crime involves B. Naturally the whole material must now be
applied to B, and in spite of the fact that it at first fitted A, it does
now fit B. Here again difficulties arise, but they are to be set aside just
as before." 109
Although it would be impossible to eliminate this danger completely, the
risk can be minimized by requiring that the corpus delicti be proved with-
out the aid of the defendant's confession, and that the confession not be
admitted until the requirement of independent proof is satisfied.
McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949); Grimes v. State, 204 Ga.
854, 51 S.E.2d 797 (1949); Clay v. State, 176 Ga. 403, 168 S.E. 289 (1933);
Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E.2d 302 (1949). INDIANA: Parker v. State,
228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949), rehearing denied, 228 Ind. 1, 89 N.E.2d 442
(1950). MAINE: State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237, 92 A.2d 327 (1952); State v.
Hoffses, 147 Me. 221, 85 A.2d 919 (1952). MICHIGAN: People v. Coapman, 326
Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949). MINNESOTA: State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368
(1860) ; but see State v. Grear, 29 Minn. 221, 13 N.W. 140 (1882). OHio: State v.
Arnold, 63 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945). PENNsYLVANIA: Gray v. Common-
wealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882). SOUTH CAROLINA: State v. Miller, 211 S.C. 306, 45
S.E.2d 23 (1947). TENNEsszs: Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818
(1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951) ; Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W.
872 (1911). UTAH: State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938).
108. People v. McWilliams, 117 Cal. App. 732, 4 P.2d 601 (1931); People v.
Swaile, 12 Cal. App. 192, 107 Pac. 134 (1909); Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207,
158 P.2d 447 (1945); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130 (1925); Parker v.
State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949), rehearing denied, 89 N.E.2d 442 (1950);
State v. Grear, 29 Minn. 221, 13 N.W. 140 (1882); State v. James, 96 N.J.L. 132,
114 Atl. 553 (1921) ; Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943) ;
Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918
(1951).
109. GRoss, CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 33 (1911).
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Quantum of Independent Proof Required
There are many different formulations of the necessary quantum of
independent evidence of the corpus delicti. Pennsylvania is the only juris-
diction requiring that the corpus delicti be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt without using the confession, 110 although some other jurisdictions
formerly imposed a like requirement. 1 - But since the confession is ad-
mitted after prima facie independent proof has been introduced, it seems
rather unrealistic to charge the jury that, disregarding the confession, they
must be convinced of the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that the corpus delicti must be inde-
pendently proved by a prep6nderance of the evidence."12  The remaining
jurisdictions may be divided into three main groups: (1) those requiring
prima facie independent proof of the corpus delicti," 8 (2) those requiring
some quantum of independent evidence less than prima facie," 4 and (3)
110. See text at note 193 infra.
111. See Harden v. State, 109 Ala. 50, 19 So. 494 (1896), not followed in
Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657 (1919); cf. State v. Benham, 58
Ariz. 129, 140, 118 P.2d 91, 95 (1941), explained in State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 187-
88, 185 P.2d 757, 766 (1947).
112. Roberts v. State, 210 Miss. 777, 50 So.2d 356 (1951); Pope v. State, 158
Miss. 794, 131 So. 264 (1930). But cf. Buford v. State, 69 So.2d 826 (Miss. 1954)
(any corroborative evidence is sufficient which satisfies the mind that the crime is
real and not imaginary) ; Garner v. State, 132 Miss. 815, 96 So. 743 (1923) (much
slighter proof of the corpus delicti is required where there is a confession).
113. ALABAMA: Granison v. State, 117 Ala. 22, 23 So. 146 (1898); Winslow
v. State, 76 Ala. 42 (1884) ; Rutland v. State, 31 Ala. App. 43, 11 So.2d 768 (1943) ;
Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657 (1919); Whitehead v. State, 16
Ala. App. 427, 78 So. 467 (1918). But cf. Daniels v. State, 12 Ala. App. 119, 121,
68 So. 499 (1915) ("any evidence at all, even the slightest tendency"); Harden v.
State, 109 Ala. 50, 19 So. 494 (1896) (beyond a reasonable doubt), not followed in
Braxton v. State, supra. CALIFORNIA: People v. Kinder, 122 Cal. App.2d 457, 265
P.2d 24 (1954) ; People v. Day, 71 Cal. App.2d 1, 161 P.2d 803 (1945) ; People v.
Hudson, 139 Cal. App. 165, 4 P.2d 809 (1934) ("slight or prima facie evidence") ;
People v. Monks, 133 Cal. App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (1933) ; People v. Roganovich, 77
Cal. App. 158, 246 Pac. 132 (1926); People v. Hayes, 72 Cal. App. 292, 237 Pac.
390 (1925). CONECTICUT: State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 182, 75 A2d
429, 430 (1950) (evidence of a "substantial character"). FLORIDA: McElveen v.
State, 72 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1954); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130 (1925);
Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897). GEORGIA: McVeigh v. State, 205
Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949); Grimes v. State, 79 Ga. App. 489, 54 S.E2d 302
(1949). INDIANA: Dennis v. State, 230 Ind. 210, 216, 102 N.E.2d 650, 653 (1952)
("clear proof"). MAINE: State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237, 92 A.2d 327 (1952) (evi-
dence giving rise to a reasonable inference of the existence of the corpus delicti);
State v. Hoffses, 147 Me. 221, 85 A.2d 919 (1952) (same). MICHIGAN: People v.
Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949). But cf. People v. Ranney, 153 Mich.
293, 116 N.W. 999 (1908) ("some evidence"). NEw MExico: State v. Lindemuth,
56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952); State v. Chaves, 27 N.M. 504, 202 P2d 694
(1921). NORTH CAROLINA: State v. Cope, 81 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 1954). TENNESSEE:
Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918
(1951); Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911). WASHINGTON:
State v. Lutes, 38 Wash.2d 475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951) ; State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d
759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951).
114. ARKANSAS: Mouser v. State, 216 Ark. 965, 228 S.W.2d 472 (1950). IDAHO:
State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 130 Pac. 461 (1913) ; State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699,
70 Pac. 1051 (1902). MARYLAND: Weller v. State, 150 Md. 278, 132 AtI. 624 (1926).
MINNESOTA: State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368 (1860). Missouas: State v. Thompson,
333 Mo. 1069, 64 S.W.2d 277 (1933) ; State v. McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 39 S.W.2d
523 (1931). NEBRASKA: Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950).
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those which do not lay down an inflexible rule but rather decide each case
separately.
115
The difference between many of these versions of the rule requiring
independent evidence often is mainly one of language. For example, as-
suming a requirement that there be proof of the corpus delicti completely
independent of the defendant's confession, there is, except in a rare case,
only a minute difference between requiring prima fade proof and some
measure less than prima facie proof. Similarly, there is seldom any
difference between requiring that there be "substantial" independent proof
of the corpus delicti and that there be "some" independent proof.
Certain evidence which normally is inadmissible is not wholly value-
less logically, for example, hearsay and evidence which is held legally
irrelevant because of the danger that it will raise collateral issues or un-
duly prejudice the defendant. To compensate for the burden imposed on
the prosecution of, in effect, proving the corpus delicti twice, once inde-
pendently and once through the confession, it might be thought that the
rules governing the admissibility of evidence would be relaxed somewhat
in the first instance. It seems fairly well settled, however, that courts
will not allow otherwise incompetent evidence to help fulfill the required
NEvAdA: In re Kelly, 28 Nev. 491, 83 Pac. 223 (1905). RHODE ISLAND: State v.
Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259 (1899). SOUTH CAROLINA: State v. Blocker, 205 S.C. 303, 31
S.E.2d 908 (1944). But see State v. Thomas, 222 S.C. 484, 73 S.E.2d 722 (1952)
(court implies that prima facie proof required). VERMONT: State v. Blay, 77 Vt.
56, 58 Atl. 794 (1904). VIRaGINIA: Campbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 825, 75
S.E.2d 468 (1953); Cleek v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 697, 181 S.E. 359 (1935).
WEST VIRGINIA: State v. Blackwell, 102 W.Va. 421, 135 S.E. 393 (1926).
115. ARIZONA: State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947) (must have
"reasonable proof" of the corpus delicti aliunde). DEIAwARE: State v. Kehm, 103
A.2d 781, 782 (Del. Super. 1954) ("I understand the better reasoned cases to hold
that the quantum of proof aliunde should be that which, though not in itself con-
clusive, when taken in connectiori with the confession, establishes the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt."). KANSAS: State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 Pac.
597 (1913) (the independent evidence plus the confession must establish the corpus
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt). MONTANA: State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont. 9,
105 P.2d 679 (1940) (some independent evidence which together with the confession
will establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt). OHIO: State v. Maranda,
94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916) (Ohio courts have not attempted to set the
quantum of extrinsic proof needed; it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt or even
prima facie; there must be some proof, not necessarily direct, but usually circumstan-
tial, tending to prove the fact that the crime was committed.); State v. Arnold,
63 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (some evidence). OKLAHOMA: Ridinger v. State,
267 P.2d 175 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953); Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Cr. 326, 245 P.2d
764 (1952) ; Osborn v. State, 86 Okla. Cr. 259, 194 P.2d 176 (1948). OREGoN: State
v. Howard, 102 Ore. 431, 203 Pac. 311 (1921) ; State v. Weston, 102 Ore. 102, 201
Pac. 1083 (1921). WYoMING: Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 562, 76 Pac. 577, 578
(1904) ("such extrinsic corroborating circumstances as will, in connection with the
confession, show the prisoner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"). FEDERAL: 4th
Cir.: Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denoied, 340 U.S.
930 (1951) ("substantial evidence of the crime"). 8th Cir.: Gulotta v. United
States, 113 F.2d 683, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1940) ("a substantial showing which together
with the defendant's confession or admission establishes the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt. . . . [There must be] independent proof of the corpus delicti, however
slight such proof may be."). 10th Cir.: Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945,
952 (10th Cir. 1954) (evidence must fairly and reasonably show the elements of the
corpus delicti). D.C. Cir.: Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir.), olt certi-
fied questions, 302 U.S. 220 (1937) ("substantial evidence").
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quantum of independent proof of the corpus delicti." 6 Where the defend-
ant confessed that he had had incestuous relations with his daughter, and
the daughter admitted the fact before trial but repudiated the statement at
trial, conviction was reversed on the ground that her prior inconsistent
statement could serve only as impeachment of her credibility, not as sub-
stantive proof that the crime had been committed. n 7 Likewise, conviction
of sodomy was reversed where the only proof of the corpus delicti inde-
pendent of the defendant's confession was the hearsay statement of the
three-year-old alleged victim, who did not testify at the trial."
8
Variations in the Requirement of Proof Depending on the Nature of
the Crime.-Certain crimes, by nature, afford less evidence of either the
basic injury or of criminality than do most crimes.'" The body is seldom
recovered when murder is committed on the high seas, and unless there was
an eye-witness to the crime there would be no direct proof of either element
of the corpus delicti. In a case of infanticide, the body, because of its small
size, is often disposed of without a trace, and because of the helplessness of
the infant and the ease with which it can be killed there is rarely any direct
or strong circumstantial evidence of the criminality. As a matter of fact,
it is often possible for an unmarried mother, the most frequent perpetrator
of this crime, to conceal the fact that the baby was ever born. In some
instances, crimes such as incest and sodomy have no "victim" since the
actions of both of the parties who participate in the offense are voluntary;
and there are no lasting physicial manifestations of the crime comparable to
the dead body in murder or the burned building in arson.120 Consequently,
proof of the corpus delicti of these crimes is very difficult.
Some courts have consciously recognized the problem by holding that
the best evidence obtainable in view of the nature of the crime is all that
is required in addition to the defendant's confession. 121 Other courts, al-
though they do not articulate a rule of this type, out of necessity seem to
accept less independent proof of the corpus delicti in prosecutions for
crimes which by their nature would afford less evidence.' 2m On the other
116. See cases cited in notes 117, 118 infra. But cf. Benjamin v. State, 274
S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955) (testimony of an accomplice plus defendant's
confession sufficient to prove the corpus delicti without any independent evidence).
117. State v Cope, 81 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 1954); see also, Commonwealth v.
Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E2d 468 (1947); Cohron v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 331, 242 S.W.2d 776 (1951).
118. Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951); State v.
Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954). But ef. People v. Korak, 303 Ill. 438, 135 N.E.
764 (1922).
119. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 286 (2d ed. 1852).
120. The court used this analysis in Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426 (1856) (con-
viction reversed since there was no independent evidence whatsoever).
121. United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. 636, No. 16,707 (1st Cir. 1858);
State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947) ; State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606,
135 Pac. 597 (1913); cf. United States v. Gilbert, 2 Sumn. 19, 27 (U.S. Cir. Ct.
1834).
122. Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 158 P.2d 447, 452 (1945) (conviction
of infanticide affirmed; no extrinsic evidence that the child had had independent life
or that death was criminally caused; see dissenting opinion) ; Warmke v. Common-
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hand, North Carolina recognizes the problem but maintains that the same
standard of independent proof must be met in every case, even where the
corpus delicti is extremely difficult to prove.1m
Less Proof Required of Criminality than of the Basic Injury.-In
many types of cases involving confessions, although there is often direct
proof of the basic injury, it is very difficult to prove aliunde that the in-
jury was the result of a criminal, rather than a natural or accidental,
cause.Y24 This is especially true in those murder cases where the death has
been undiscovered for years and, therefore, the body is in an advanced state
of decomposition, or in arson cases, where any potential evidence is usually
destroyed in the fire itself. Although only two courts have specifically
stated that less proof of the criminality is required than of the basic in-
jury,1 25 examination of the facts of cases in which the body was not found
for a number of years after death or in which all the evidence was con-
sumed in the fire indicates clearly that several other courts of necessity
adhere to such a rule.'2
It is not difficult to imagine how this relaxation of the requirement of
independent proof of the criminality developed. In the cases which
prompted some courts to establish the corpus delicti rule, the wrongful
convictions would not have taken place if proof of death had been required
independent of the defendant's confession. The courts may have been
anticipating the need for independent proof of the criminality, but their
immediate concern was with proof of the basic injury.
wealth, 297 Ky. 649, 180 S.W.2d 872 (1944) (Prosecution for manslaughter; defend-
ant stated that she accidentally had dropped her illegitimate infant from a trestle.
Although the body never was recovered, the court held that evidence that the creek
under the trestle was flooded, that a baby cap was found near the creek, that the
defendant had not dropped the coat in which the baby was wrapped, and that the
defendant had not reported the loss of the child was sufficient independent proof that
the baby was dead and that death was criminally caused. The court did not indicate
that it was consciously requiring less proof of the corpus delicti than in any other
case.); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943) (Conviction
of infanticide affirmed; defendant had confessed to smothering her sister's eight-day-
old illegitimate child and burning its body in a furnace; the body never was found.
There was independent evidence -that defendant had left the hospital with the
child, that the child was normal and healthy, that the child was not capable of
moving about or surviving without frequent nourishment, that defendant had as-
sumed responsibility for the child's care, and that defendant had made several false
statements as to the child's whereabouts. The appellate court held this to be
sufficient evidence, without considering the confession, to support a jury finding that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the child was dead and its death was criminally caused.).
123. State v. Cope, 81 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 1954).
124. This problem is not confined to cases involving confessions. As a matter
of fact, the problem is even greater where the prosecution must prove the corpus
delicti without the aid of a confession.
125. Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720 (1879) (murder); see also McVeigh v.
State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949) (murder). Although Alabama requires
prima facie proof of the corpus delicti aliunde the confession, see note 113 supra, in
Daniels v. State, 12 Ala. App. 119, 121, 68 So. 499 (1915), the court said that "any
evidence at all, even the slightest tendency, that the burning was by design" would be
sufficient. Conviction was reversed, however, since there was no evidence at all.
126. Ezell v. State, 217 Ark. 94, 229 S.W.2d 32 (1950) ; cases cited in notes 127-
30 infra.
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In a case in which the defendant confessed that he had murdered the
deceased with his hands and pointed out the place where a skeleton iden-
tified as the deceased was found, the court accepted evidence that the de-
ceased had been in good health immediately before her disappearance as
sufficient independent proof of criminality.2 7 In another case where the
defendant confessed that he had murdered the deceased, the only inde-
pendent evidence of murder was the body and the testimony of a witness
that he had heard a woman scream one night near the place where the body
was found. Conviction was affirmed although there was no evidence
connecting the scream with the time of the deceased's death 2 8 In an
Illinois case in which the defendant confessed that he had burned a school
building, there was evidence that footprints leading to and from the burned
building matched those of defendant and were made at approximately the
time of the fire, and also evidence that the defendant had been discharged
from the school board shortly before. The court accepted this as sufficient
independent proof that the burning was wilful.'2 In State v. Blocker ' 30
the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which ordinarily requires proof of
the corpus delicti completely independent of the confession,13 ' accepted the
elimination of other possible causes of burning as sufficient independent
proof of wilfulness. An interesting comparison can be made between these
cases, in which there was clear proof of the basic injury, and State v.
Levesque, 3 2 in which there was a reversal of a conviction of arson by the
Maine Supreme Court because there was not clear proof that any part of the
building had burned, the evidence showing only that some rubbish in the
cellar had been consumed.
As a practical matter, the rule that less proof is required of the
criminality than of the basic injury can be said to exist in every jurisdiction
which enunciates a requirement of only slight proof of both elements of
the corpus delicti. Since normally there is indisputable evidence of the
basic injury,1as the advantage to the prosecution of having to produce only
slight proof actually is effective only with respect to the criminality.
127. Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189 S.W.2d 917 (1945).
128. Gantling v. State, 41 Fla. 587, 26 So. 737 (1899).
129. People v. Hannibal, 259 Ill. 512, 102 N.E. 1042 (1913) ; see also Winslow
v. State, 76 Ala. 42 (1884); Granison v. State, 117 Ala. 22, 23 So. 146 (1898);
State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429 (1950) ; State v. Rogoway, 45
Ore. 601, 78 Pac. 987 (1904), reversed on other grounds on rehearing, 45 Ore. 601,
81 Pac. 234 (1905).
130. 205 S.C. 303, 31 S.E.2d 908 (1944).
131. See South Carolina cases cited in note 101 supra.
132. 146 Me. 351, 81 A.2d 665 (1951).
133. But cf. State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218 (1859), in which defendant confessed
that he and his wife had checked into a certain hotel on a certain day, that they had
quarreled, that they had walked to a nearby river, and that he had drowned her.
All details of the confession, except what transpired between the time the couple
left for the river and the time he returned, were supported by testimony of witnesses.
No body was ever found. The appellate court affirmed conviction of murder in the
first degree on the ground that confessions in court do not require independent proof,
adding that there was sufficient independent proof in this case to have warranted
conviction had the confession been extra-judicial. See also text at and following
note 119 supra.
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Significance of the Jury Charge
It is not clear from the decisions whether the corpus delicti rule re-
quires merely that there be a certain quantum of independent evidence of
the corpus delicti in the record, or whether the jury's verdict must be
based to some extent on that independent evidence. If the former is
true, then the rule is simply a test to be applied by the court, and no
charge on this point is necessary. If the latter, then a charge would be
imperative, although as a practical matter it would play a significant role
in relatively few cases.
A charge to the jury would be unimportant when the extrinsic evi-
dence introduced undoubtedly would convince the jury that a murder had
been committed. This would be the case if a defendant confessed to
murder and the prosecution produced testimony by witnesses who posi-
tively identified the body of the deceased and testimony by the coroner
that death was caused by a bullet wound in the back.
A charge could be important when the jury might disbelieve the
extrinsic evidence introduced by the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti.
An example would be a murder prosecution in which the defendant con-
fessed that, months earlier, he had murdered the deceased by hitting him
over the head and throwing the body in a river, and in which there was
testimony that a decayed body of the same sex, and approximate in size to
the deceased, had been found in the river, that bits of clothing found on
the body matched the clothes which the deceased had been wearing on the
day he disappeared, and that the wound on the deceased's head might have
come from either a blow by a blunt instrument or from contact with rocks
in the river. Without instructions that the corpus delicti cannot be proved
by the confession alone, the jury might return a verdict based solely on the
confession. But even when the jury might be unconvinced by the inde-
pendent evidence, the effect of proper instructions often would be ques-
tionable. This would be especially true where the independent evidence
presents a question of credibility, as where the defendant confesses to
forcible rape but claims at the trial that the prosecutrix had consented,
and the only evidence of criminality other than the confession is the testi-
mony of the prosecutrix. It is possible that the jury originally disbelieved
the prosecutrix but was swayed the other way on the question of credibility
once the confession had been introduced. Thus a verdict of guilty really
would be based on the confession. However, it is doubtful that once the
confession had been introduced the jury could answer the question of how
they would have decided the issue of credibility had there been no con-
fession.
Wheeler v. Commonwealth ' 3 4 is the only case discovered in which a
conviction was reversed because of the trial court's failure to charge the
jury that the confession by itself is not sufficient proof of the corpus delicti,
134. 191 Va. 665, 66 S.E.2d 605 (1951) ; cf. Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42, 47-48
(1884); Coley v. State, 110 Ga. 271, 34 S.E. 845 (1899).
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even though the appellate court found there was sufficient independent evi-
dence in the record. The court was aware of the possibility that the jury
might have based its verdict on the confession alone.
In Pennsylvania the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed, without considering the confession. 13 5 Since the
confession has been introduced into evidence before the jury considers its
verdict, it is necessary that there be proper instructions.13 6 The practicality
of this rule also is doubtful, since it is almost certain that the jury will be
influenced by knowledge of the confession.
CORROBORATION
Some jurisdictions which hold that the defendant's confession is not
sufficient for conviction are satisfied with some extrinsic corroboration of
the confession, 3 7 instead of requiring independent proof of the corpus
delicti.
135. See text at note 195 infra.
136. See Commonwealth v. Danarowicz, 294 Pa. 190, 194, 144 Atl. 127, 128
(1928).
137. Anderson v. United States, 124 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other
groutds, 318 U.S. 350 (1943); Wiggins v. United States, 64 F.2d 950 (9th Cir.
1933); Aplin v. United States, 41 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1930); Pearlman v. United
States, 10 F2d 460 (9th Cir. 1926); Martinez v. People, 267 P.2d 654 (Colo.
1954); State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 Pac. 597 (1913); State v. Geltzeiler,
101 N.J.L. 415, 128 AtI. 240 (1925); State v. Banusik, 84 N.J.L. 640, 64 Atl. 994
(1906). Cf. Opper v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 158 (1954).
At one time Georgia required corroboration only. Anderson v. State, 72 Ga.
98 (1884); Green, Evideice, 3 MERCER L. REv. 100-02 (1951). But Bines v. State,
118 Ga. 320, 45 S.E. 376 (1903), held that there must be independent proof of the
corpus delicti, misciting Murray v. State, 43 Ga. 256 (1871), which merely said
that a confession alone cannot support a conviction. Wimberly v. State, 105 Ga.
188, 31 S.E. 162 (1898), had held that independent proof of the corpus delicti was
sufficient corroboration but did not say that such proof was necessary. Although
Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 43, 57 (1872), which says that a confession which is
corroborated by only one circumstance is sufficient for conviction, has never been
overruled, it has not been cited recently. The Georgia statute states merely that:"a confession alone, uncorroborated by other evidence will not justify a conviction.'
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-420 (1933).
Illinois at one time required only corroboration of any number of the great
variety of facts which usually attend or are incidentally connected with the commission
of every crime. Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426 (1855). But later cases require that
this corroboration also tend to prove the corpus delicti. People v. Harrison, 261
Ill. 517, 104 N.E. 259 (1914); People v. Gavurnik, 2 Ill.2d 190, 117 N.E.2d 782
(1954).
A statement by an early New York court, in People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53,
59 (N.Y. 1836), that: "Full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, inde-
pendently of the confession, is not required . . . ; and in many . . . (cases]
slight corroborating facts were held sufficient," has been cited for the proposition
that proof of the corpus delicti independent of the confession is not required at all
if there is incidental corroboration. E.g., Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566,
571 (2d Cir. 1918) ; People v. Bergen, 17 Ill. 426, 429 (1856) ; State v. Banusik, 84
N.J.L. 640, 646-47, 64 Atl. 994, 996 (1906). But later cases indicate that the rule
in New York is that there must be independent proof of the corpus delicti. People
v. Deacons, 109 N.Y. 374, 16 N.E. 676 (1888); see People v. Steinmetz, 240 N.Y.
411, 148 N.E. 597 (1925) (must have independent proof that the crime was com-
mitted, but affirmed since counsel did not make a timely objection).
Judge Learned Hand in Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566, 571 (2d Cir.
1918)., stated that: "The corroboration must touch the corpus delicti in the sense
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"A great variety of facts usually attend, or are incidentally connected
with, the commission of every crime. Proof of any number of these
facts and circumstances, consistent with the truth of the confession,
or which the confession has led to the discovery of, and which would
not probably have existed had the crime not been committed, neces-
sarily corroborate it, and increase the probability of its truth." 138
Discovery of the deceased's body as a result of the defendant's confessing
where he had buried his victim would be sufficient corroboration, although
it probably would not be sufficient independent proof of the corpus delicti
except in North Dakota. 3 9 Since the death was proved, however, it could
not be said that there was no evidence of the corpus delicti.
The difference between a jurisdiction which requires slight independent
proof which may be used in conjunction with the confession in proving the
corpus delicti and a jurisdiction which requires mere corroboration of
the confession is mainly one of semantics. Only in rare instances would
there be sufficient corroboration to satisfy a corroboration court which
would not be sufficient independent proof of the corpus delicti, when added
to the confession, to satisfy a court of the other type. Likewise, there
would be little practical difference between holding that mere corroboration
is sufficient and holding, as does North Dakota, that there must be inde-
pendent proof of the corpus delicti but that the corpus delicti consists of the
death only, since it seems unlikely that a court would consider the cor-
roboration requirement satisfied if there was no proof of the basic injury
other than the defendant's confession.1
40
The other jurisdictions requiring proof of the corpus delicti generally
require more evidence than would be necessary to satisfy the corroboration
theory. Apparently jurisdictions following the corroboration rule have
greater confidence in confessions than these other courts. One judge
posed the possibility, however, that there might be a situation in which
there would be independent proof of the corpus delicti which would not be
of the injury against whose occurrence the law is directed- . . . Independently
[the corroborating circumstances] . . . need not establish the truth of the corpus
delicti at all, neither beyond a reasonable doubt nor by a preponderance of proof."
Although somewhat ambiguous, this statement apparently means that independent
proof of the corpus delicti is required, rather than mere corroboration tending to
give confidence in the truth of the confession. Opper v. United States, 75 Sup.
Ct. 158, 164 (1954) ; Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, 241-43 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
The latter part of Judge Hand's statement has, however, been quoted as standing
for the corroboration rule, rather than proof of the corpus delicti. Pearlman v.
United States, 10 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Wynkoop v. United States, 22 F.2d
799 (9th Cir. 1927). Later Second Circuit opinions clearly follow the rule requiring
independent proof of the corpus delicti. See Markman v. United States, 193 F.2d
574 (2d Cir. 1951).
At one time the Fourth Circuit required mere corroboration, Bolland v. United
States, 238 Fed. 529 (4th Cir. 1916), but today requires independent proof of the
corpus delicti. Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 930 (1951).
138. Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426, 428-29 (1855). But see note 137 supra.
139. See text at notes 64-66 and notes 64-66 supra.
140. But cf. State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 130 Pac. 461 (1913).
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corroborative of the confession 141 as, for example, where the defendant
confesses that he stabbed X to death but discovery of X's body reveals that
death was caused by bullet wounds. Although only a few courts state the
requirement of extrinsic evidence in terms expressly indicating that there
must be proof of the corpus delicti which is also corroborative of the con-
fession, 12 if a case such as the one suggested should arise it is extremely
doubtful that any court would hold the evidence to be sufficient.
The main problems which exist in jurisdictions which require inde-
pendent proof of the corpus delicti are minimized in corroboration juris-
dictions. It is obviously necessary that the confession be used with the
extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether there is corroboration.
The courts following the corroboration rule apparently never set down a
definite quantum of independent evidence which is required, but rather
state the rule in general terms such as "some proof." However, basically
the same problem of instructing the jury exists in this type jurisdiction as
in a jurisdiction which requires independent evidence of the corpus delicti.
Where there is incontrovertible physical evidence corroborating the con-
fession, there is little need for a detailed charge. But where there is con-
tradictory independent evidence, it is important that the jury be instructed
to acquit if it disbelieves the prosecution's evidence; for example, where
the defendant confesses to arson and one witness testifies that he saw the
defendant entering the building in question just before the fire and another
witness testifies that the defendant was not near the scene of the fire at that
time, the jury should be told that a verdict of guilty cannot be based on
the confession alone and that it should acquit if it disbelieves the witness
who said that he saw the defendant at the scene of the fire.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
Judicial Confessions
There is an abundance of authority for the proposition that a judicial
confession is sufficient to support conviction even though unaccompanied
by any other evidence.14' In Skaggs v. State14 4 the prosecutrix reported to
a justice of the peace that she had been raped. She took an officer into
the park and showed him where two pairs of footprints, one matching the
prosecutrix's feet and the other matching the defendant's, led off into the
141. State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 589, 83 P.2d 1010, 1018 (1938) (dissenting
opinion).
142. People v. Gavurnik, 2 I11.2d 190, 194, 117 N.E.2d 782, 785 (1954) ; State v.
Morro, 313 Mo. 98, 108, 281 S.W. 720, 722 (1926); State v. Knapp, 70 Ohio St.
380, 393, 71 N.E. 705, 707 (1904).
143. E.g., cases cited in notes 144, 145 infra; accord, People v. Manske, 399 Ill.
176, 186, 77 N.E.2d 164, 169 (1948) ; see State v. Cowan, 29 N.C. 239, 244 (1847) ;
State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 371, 114 N.E. 1038, 1040 (1916) ; State v. Johnson,
95 Utah 572, 583, 83 P.2d 1010, 1016 (1938). But cf. N.D. REv. CODE § 12-2729
(1943), to the effect that in prosecutions for murder, manslaughter, or aiding suicide,
upon a plea of not guilty, the confession of the accused shall not be admissible to
prove the death of the person alleged to have been killed.
144. 88 Ark. 62, 113 S.W. 346 (1908).
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woods where there were signs of a struggle. Prosecutrix's undergarment
was torn, and witnesses claimed that they had seen the defendant and
prosecutrix together in the park. Defendant was arrested and confessed to
the charge of rape at a hearing before a magistrate. While awaiting trial,
the defendant was visited four times by the prosecutrix. At trial both
defendant and the prosecutrix retracted the previous statements and denied
having had intercourse. They claimed that the defendant was the "Lord
of Lords" and the "Host of Hosts," that he wanted to be hanged so that
he could be resurrected in three days, and that together they had simulated
a rape to achieve this end. Prosecutrix claimed she had been raped spirit-
ually but not physically. Defendant asserted that, while awaiting trial, he
had learned that he might receive a prison sentence instead of being exe-
cuted, and that therefore he and the prosecutrix withdrew their original
story. Conviction of rape was affirmed on the ground that a judicial con-
fession is sufficient by itself to support conviction. There was a dissenting
opinion in which it was pointed out that, although a judicial confession by
itself is not insufficient as a matter of law, neither is it sufficient as a matter
of law, and that in the instant case, even taking the confession into con-
sideration, there was not sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. In State
v. Lamb 145 the Missouri court affirmed a conviction of murder in the first
degree, although no body was found, on the basis of a detailed confession by
the defendant in the magistrate's court.
There is some disagreement as to what constitutes a judicial confes-
sion. Certainly a confession made at the trial in the form of testimony is a
judicial confession.14 A confession given in magistrate's court has been
held to be judicial, 4 7 although one court has said that since the defendant
had a right of appeal from the magistrate's court he could not be convicted
on his testimony in that court without other evidence. 148 A confession at a
coroner's inquest has been held to be merely quasi-judicial and, therefore,
governed by the rules which apply to extra-judicial confessions.1 49 It is
not clear whether a plea of guilty at a former trial is even admissible in
evidence. 13 In Kercheval v. United States 151 the Supreme Court held that
use of a former plea as evidence would conflict with permission to withdraw
that plea and that therefore it was inadmissible. The New York1 52 and
Connecticut 1 53 courts, however, have held that a former plea of guilty is
145. 28 Mo. 218 (1859); see discussion of this case in note 133 supra.
146. IowA CoDE ANN. § 782.7 (1946); Ky. CoDEs, CRim. PRc. § 240 (1948);
Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; see State v. Abrams, 131 Iowa
479, 482, 108 N.W. 1041, 1042 (1906); State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218, 230 (1859);
People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 148, 153 (N.Y. 1836).
147. Skaggs v. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S.W. 346 (1908) ; see State v. Lamb, 28
Mo. 218, 230 (1859).
148. Jenkins v. State, 98 Miss. 717, 54 So. 158 (1911).
149. Ezell v. State, 217 Ark. 94, 229 S.W.2d 32 (1950).
150. See MoRGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvIDENcE 247-48 (1954).
151. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
152. People v. Steinmetz, 240 N.Y. 411, 148 N.E. 597 (1925).
153. State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 Atl. 411 (1915).
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admissible but, like an extra-judicial confession, must be supported by
independent evidence of the corpus delicti.
The reasoning behind the limitation on the requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti has been stated to be that the solemnity of formal
judicial proceedings, the deliberateness of the occasion, the advice of
counsel, and the guidance of the presiding judge will cure, or at least lessen
greatly, the dangers inherent in a conviction based solely on the extra-
judicial confession of the accused. 154 Courts are generally less suspicious
of confessions made in their presence, and there is no danger of misreport-
ing.1 5 The Iowa Supreme Court indicated that a confession before a com-
mitting magistrate was not a judicial confession since the procedure in the
Iowa magistrates' courts lacks the requisite formality.156 Another court
held that the defendant's confession before a magistrate was not judicial
since he was not represented by counsel.
157
However, it should be recognized that many of the dangers present
in extra-judicial confessions 168 remain in judicial confessions. Certain
police methods are so efficient that their influence extends into the court
room. In a case in which the police played on the defendant's fear of the
lynch mob, the defendant was so frightened that he desired conviction in
order to be safe in prison.6 9 A false judicial confession in that case was
almost as possible as an extra-judicial one. It is possible for a defendant to
have been so intimidated by a police beating that he will confess falsely in
court.1' ° And certainly where a psychological problem is involved there
is almost as much danger of a false confession in the courtroom as out of it.
Where an innocent defendant is faced with overwhelming circumstantial
evidence of guilt, he might confess in court in order to receive a mitigated
sentence.161 The courts seem to overestimate the value of a judicial, as con-
trasted with an extra-judicial, confession. Perhaps the reason is that they
have less emotional distrust of a confession made before them. Certainly
the distrust would be greater where the defendant has repudiated his con-
fession before trial.
Admissions and Exculpatory Statements
Statements by the accused pertaining to his participation in the crime
may be classified into three main groups: (1) Confessions-conscious ac-
knowledgments of guilt of the crime with which the defendant is charged;
154. State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218, 230 (1859).
155. Compare text at note 29 and note 29 supra.
156. State v. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479, 108 N.W. 1041 (1906).
157. Commonwealth v. Banks, 58 Dauph. Co. Rep. 134 (Pa., Ct. Oyer & Ter.
1947).
158. See text at and following note 27 supra.
159. Case of John A. Johnson (Wisconsin, 1911), in BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT 112 (1932).
160. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sheeler v. Burke, 367 Pa. 152, 79 A.2d 654
(1951).
161. See text at note 33 and note 33 supra.
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(2) Admissions--disclosures of any of the material facts of the crime short
of an acknowledgment of guilt; and (3) Exculpatory Statements-state-
ments that explain the defendant's actions rather than admit guilt. 1 2 Some
courts require independent proof of the corpus delicti only when the defend-
ant's statements amount to a confession; 163 other courts apply the rule to
confessions and admissions but not to exculpatory statements; 14 while still
other courts apply the rule to all three types of statements.165
An analogous problem exists in the application of the rule excluding
involuntary statements by the accused.16 6  Some courts exclude only con-
fessions of guilt; '16 others bar both confessions and admissions. 168  Since
the rule requiring independent proof of the corpus delicti is based to some
extent on the belief that the rule excluding involuntary statements fails
to protect defendants completely, it is significant to note that Arizona 1'
162. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EV-DENCE §§ 579-81 (11th ed. 1935).
163. People v. Manske, 399 Il. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948) (conviction of
manslaughter affirmed; defendant made statement that he had hit deceased twice,
knocking her down); People v. Creedon, 281 N.Y. 413, 24 N.E.2d 105 (1939)
(conviction of driving truck for longer period than permitted by statute affirmed;
defendant had kept record of the trip) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Price, 67 York Leg.
Rec. 21, 22 (York County, Pa., Q.S. 1953) (conviction of drunken driving affirmed;
defendant admitted the car involved in the accident was his, from which fact it was
concluded that he had been driving) ; see Reid v. State, 168 Ala. 118, 122, 53 So.
254, 255 (1910) ; State v. Weston, 102 Ore. 102, 115, 201 Pac. 1083, 1088 (1921).
164. Opper v. United States, 211 F.2d 719, 722 (6th Cir.), aff'd on other grounds,
75 Sup. Ct. 158 (1954); Ercoli v. United States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir.
1942) ; see Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 169, 82 So. 657, 659 (1919). Wig-
more favors this view. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 821 (3d ed. 1940).
165. State v. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479, 108 N.W. 1041 (1906) (conviction of
carrying a concealed weapon reversed; defendant admitted carrying the weapon but
claimed a right to do so) ; see Opper v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 158, 164 (1954) ;
State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P2d 757 (1947) (conviction of rape affirmed; the
court said defendant's admission of having intercourse with pr6secutrix with her
consent was not sufficient by itself, but there was independent proof); cf. Smith v.
United States, 75 Sup. Ct 194 (1954); People v. Villanueva, 74 Cal. App. 276, 240
Pac. 43 (1925) (conviction of alien carrying a firearm reversed; only evidence of
defendant's being an alien was his admission); People v. Gonzales, 74 Cal. App.
341, 240 Pac. 291 (1925) (same facts) ; State v. Jones, 108 A.2d 261 (Me. 1954) ;
State v. Carleton, 148 Me. 237, 92 A.2d 327 (1952) ; Choate v. State, 12 Okla. Cr.
560, 160 Pac. 34 (1916); Gulotta v. United States, 113 F2d 683 (8th Cir. 1940).
Iowa and Kentucky courts have reached opposite results on this point in
interpreting the statutes in their respective jurisdictions, the wording of which is
almost identical. The Kentucky Court of Appeals maintained that the statute says
"confession," and, therefore, it applies only to confessions. Hedger v. Common-
wealth, 294 Ky. 731, 172 S.W2d 560 (1943), interpreting, Ky. CODES, CRn.. PRAc.
§240 (1948). However, the Iowa Supreme Court, interpreting IowA CODE ANN.
§ 782.7 (1946), said: "The admission of the fact by the defendant tends to establish
it by his confession." State v. Dubois, 54 Iowa 363, 365, 6 N.W. 578 (1880).
166. See 2 MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 296-99 (1954).
167. See cases cited in notes 169, 170 infra.
168. See cases cited in notes 171, 172 infra; cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S.
274 (1946) (where the admission for all practical purposes amounts to a confession
of guilt).
169. Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 240 Pac. 863 (1925), cert. denied, 269
U.S. 585 (1926) (the rule as to voluntary statements does not apply to admissions) ;
see State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 187, 185 P.2d 757, 765 (1947) (corpus delicti rule
applies to admissions as well as to confessions).
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and California 170 do not exclude involuntary admissions but do require
that the corpus delicti be proved by evidence independent of such ad-
missions; on the other hand, Alabama' 7 ' and Illinois' 7 2 prohibit the in-
troduction of involuntary admissions as well as confessions, but do not
require independent proof of the corpus delicti in the case of admissions.
Although the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an exculpatory state-
ment did not come within the rule requiring independent proof of the corpus
delicti, it indicated that an exculpatory statement, by its nature, would never
in itself present sufficient proof that a crime had been committed.' 73  In
that case unidentifiable remains were found, and the defendant admitted
killing the deceased but asserted that the killing was in self-defense. The
trial court charged the jury that it was entitled to believe the defendant's
statement in part and to disbelieve it in part, and that proof of homicide
raises a presumption of malice sufficient to warrant a verdict of second
degree murder. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the second
degree, although there was no independent evidence that the killing was
felonious. The appellate court reversed, stating that: "If the main fact is
admitted, with a qualifying exclusion of a necessary ingredient of the crime
charged, the crime is not confessed. The qualification is a part of the ad-
mission, and both must be considered in interpreting the meaning of the
statement." 7 4 The Supreme Court of Missouri in a prosecution for at-
tempted robbery175 reached an illogical conclusion as to what constitutes
a confession. The defense was insanity, and evidence of statements by the
defendant that he had committed other robberies was admitted by the lower
court as relevant to the mental condition of the defendant in committing
these robberies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as proof that
the defendant had committed the other crimes, the statements were extra-
judicial confessions and were not admissible without other proof of the
corpus delicti of the crimes to which the defendant had confessed.
Statements Which Are Part of the Res Gestae
Some courts have held that independent proof of the corpus delicti is
unnecessary when the defendant's confession is admissible as part of the
170. People v. Johnson, 203 Cal. 153, 263 Pac. 524 (1928) (rule that an in-
voluntary statement is not admissible does not apply to admissions, however harmful
they may prove to be) ; People v. Villanueva, 74 Cal. App. 276, 240 Pac. 43 (1925)
(corpus delicti rule applies to admissions as well as to confessions); People v.
Gonzales, 74 Cal. App. 341, 240 Pac. 291 (1925).
171. Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24, 59 So. 270 (1912) semble; Morris v. State,
25 Ala. App. 156, 161, 142 So. 592, 596, rev'd on other groun&, 25 Ala. App. 162, 142
So. 597 (1932) (admissions must be voluntary to be admissible) ; see Reid v. State,
168 Ala. 118, 53 So. 254 (1910) (corpus delicti rule does not apply to admissions).
172. See People v. Colvin, 294 Ill. 196, 128 N.E. 396 (1920) (involuntary ad-
missions are not admissible) ; People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948)
(corpus delicti rule does not apply to admissions).
173. Wall v. State, 5 Ga. App. 305, 63 S.E. 27 (1908).
174. Id. at 308, 63 S.E. at 28.
175. State v. Flores, 332 Mo. 74, 55 S.W.2d 953 (1932). But cf. Balm v.
Commonwealth, 92 Pittsb. Leg. J. 375 (Pa., Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1942).
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res gestae.176 In Commonwealth v. Danarowicz 17 a letter written by the
defendant confessing the murder of his wife was found next to the wife's
dead body. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this letter was
correctly admitted as part of the res gestae, "a fact connected in time and
place with the offense itself," 178 and, therefore, that independent proof of
the corpus delicti was not required. In State v. Saltzman 179 the defendant
stopped his car shortly after crossing the state line into Iowa, ran to a
telephone, and called the police, telling them that a car was following him
and he feared that the liquor which he had in his car was in danger of
being hijacked. While the defendant was telephoning, the car which had
been following him pushed his car away. There was no independent evi-
dence that the defendant's car contained liquor, except the testimony of
witnesses that the defendant's car seemed heavily loaded. However, they
could not tell what was in the car. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a
conviction of illegally transporting liquor across the state line, holding that
the defendant's confession was admissible as part of the res gestae and no
independent proof was required.
The logic behind this exception to the rule seems questionable. An
extra-judicial confession is hearsay evidence, but is admissible under the
theory that a confession lacks the weaknesses of ordinary hearsay because
the defendant cannot be heard to complain that he was deprived of the
right to cross-examine himself or that his own statements were not under
oath.18s0 Res gestae statements are likewise admissible hearsay under
the theory that when a statement is made in the excitement of the moment
the declarant probably has not used his mental processes to concoct an
untrue story.""1 These, however, are rules governing the competence of
evidence to be admitted. The rule that the prosecution must prove the
corpus delicti by evidence independent of the defendant's confession is a
rule governing the sufficiency of evidence to convict. It is illogical to hold
that, merely because the same class of evidence becomes admissible as part
of the res gestae rather than as a confession, the rule as to sufficiency does
not apply.'
82
176. State v. Clark, 102 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276 (1936) (conviction of gambling
affirmed; defendant made statements in card game where chips were being used:
"I will bet a dollar . . . I am loser a dollar.") ; Majors v. State, 100 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 304, 273 S.W. 267 (1925) (conviction for illegal manufacture of liquor affirmed;
defendant made statement upon arrest near the still: "You have got me.") ; see notes
177, 179 infra.
177. 294 Pa. 190, 144 AtI. 127 (1928).
178. Id. at 194, 144 Atl. at 128.
179. 241 Iowa 1373, 44 N.W.2d 24 (1950).
180. Morgan, Admissions as ai Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE LJ.
355, 361 (1921); 4 WIGmoRE, EviDENcE §§ 1048, 1050 (3d ed. 1940).
181. 2 MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMs OF EVIDENCE 296-99 (1954).
182. This theory was apparently used by the court in Carr v. State, 21 Ala. App.
299, 109 So. 730 (1926) (statements admissible as part of the res gestae, but not
sufficient to convict without independent proof of the corpus delicti) ; see also State
v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 1383, 44 N.W.2d 24, 35 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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Statements Made Before the Commission of the Crime
In the few cases in which the question has been presented, it has been
held that statements made by the defendant before the commission of the
crime do not need support of independent proof of the corpus delicti.18m
In Warzower v. United States -14 the defendant was prosecuted for enter-
ing the United States with a passport which had been secured by false
statements as to the defendant's name, citizenship, place of birth, and
residence abroad. The Government introduced the manifest of alien pas-
sengers of the ship on which the defendant allegedly first came to the United
States, his draft registration papers, and an application for re-entry in order
to show defendant's statements as to his alleged name, citizenship, place
of birth, and residence abroad. The Supreme Court held that, since the
statements were made before the commission of the crime, independent
proof of the falsity of the statements was not required. The Court said
that the purpose of the requirement of independent proof is to prevent
conviction on a false confession. "Where the inconsistent statement was
made prior to the crime this danger does not exist." 18 In Commonwealth
v. Jones 186 the Pennsylvania Superior Court held statements made by the
defendant before the crime that he had insured his building and that some-
one was going to burn it were admissible in an arson prosecution and
were sufficient to convict without independent proof of the corpus delicti.
The greatest dangers of a conviction based solely on the confession
of the defendant are eliminated where his statements were made before
the commission of the crime. When the statements are removed from the
context of the crime which allegedly has been committed, the possibility
of a pathological confession is greatly lessened, if not eliminated, and cer-
tainly no danger of third degree methods exists.
Misdemeanors
There is a split in the decisions as to whether the corpus delicti of
misdemeanors and lower grade crimes must be proved independently.
North Dakota has a unique rule, applying the requirement only to murder,
manslaughter, and aiding suicide.' 8 7 Some courts have held that the rule
applies only to felonies, 8 thus excluding misdemeanors and lesser viola-
183. See notes 184, 186 infra.
184. 312 U.S. 342 (1940).
185. Id. at 347.
186. 97 Pa. Super. 417 (1929).
187. N.D. REv. CoDE § 12-2729 (1943). It would seem that the North Dakota
Supreme Court would limit the rule to the specific language of the statute since in
State v. Gibson, 69 N.D. 70, 284 N.W. 209 (1938), this section of the statute
was interpreted strictly according to its language on another point. See text pre-
ceding note 66 supra.
188. Commonwealth v. Quick, 15 Pa. Dist. R. 260 (Monroe County Q.S. 1905);
State v. Gilbert, 36 Vt. 145 (1863) ; see Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 70 Pa. D. & C.
366, 368 (Montgomery County Q.S. 1949); Egbert v. State, 113 Neb. 790, 795,.205
N.W. 252, 254 (1925).
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tions. Other courts have applied the rule to both felonies and mis-
demeanors .1 9  New York seems to apply the rule to all felonies and mis-
demeanors, and to offenses which carry the same stigma and penalty as
misdemeanors, 190 but not to "infractions." 191
A wrongful conviction certainly is much more shocking to a court
when the punishment is execution or long imprisonment than when only a
short prison term is involved; but from the point of view of the community
the more serious the offense, ordinarily the more important it is that the
guilty party not escape conviction. At present, however, the often illogical
distinctions drawn by many legislatures between felonies and misdemeanors
provide no sound basis for a decision as to whether the corpus delicti rule
should be relaxed or eliminated as to a particular class of crimes.
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF TH1E RULE
According to the language of the Pennsylvania decisions, prima facie
independent evidence of the corpus delicti must be in the record before the
defendant's extra-judicial confession is admitted in evidence. The corpus
delicti is sufficiently proved to warrant the introduction of the confession
"where the circumstances attending death are consistent with crime, though
they also may be consistent with accident . . ., or suicide . . ., and it is
not necessary to show by affirmative proof that the latter two possibilities do
not exist before evidence as to who did the act is admitted . .. 192
Then the jury should be instructed that they must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of the corpus delicti before they can take
the defendant's confession into consideration. 9 3 The rule was first set
189. Commonwealth v. Allen, 41 Del. Co. 56 (Delaware County, Pa., Oyer &
Ter. 1953); Commonwealth v. Waugh, 56 Pa. D. & C. 170 (Montgomery
County Q.S. 1946) (court applied the rule to a misdemeanor without discussing
the possibility that a misdemeanor might be an exception).
190. People v. Williams, 119 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Spec. Sess. 1953) (conviction of
offense of street walking reversed). Cotra: People v. Erickson, 171 N.Y. Misc.
937, 13 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1939), rev'd on other grounds, 283 N.Y. 210, 28 N.E.2d 381
(1940).
191. People v. Lowey, Horovits & Fischer, Inc., 186 N.Y. Misc. 745, 60 N.Y.S.2d
145 (1946).
192. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 282 Pa. 458, 464, 128 At. 87, 90 (1925) (no
confession involved). The following cases in which confessions were involved quote
this language from Gardner with approval: Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128,
135, 16 A.2d 401, 405 (1940); Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 79, 135 Atl.
538, 539 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 53, 131 AtI. 657, 659 (1926).
193. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 Atl. 657 (1926) ; Commonwealth
v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 Atl. 401 (1923) ; Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380
(1882); see Commonwealth v. Danarowicz, 294 Pa. 190, 194, 144 Atl. 127, 128
(1928). Cf. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943), in which
the court said: "In practice, the rule requires that the jury may not consider such
confession as evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, unless the
Commonwealth shall have produced evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime charged was committed by someone." Id. at 502, 31
A.2d at 157. (Italics added.)
It could be argued that the court was saying that the defendant's confession
could be used as cumulative proof of the corpus delicti once prima facie independent
proof is introduced, but cannot be used as proof of defendant's agency in the crime
until the jury is convinced of the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
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forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1882 in Gray v. Common-
wealth,9 4 a case which remains in full force today.
"The true rule in such cases is believed to be this: when the common-
wealth has given sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to entitle the
case to go to the jury, it is competent to show a confession made by
the prisoner connecting him with the crime. Under such circum-
stances the jury should first pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence
of the corpus delicti. If it satisfies them beyond a reasonable doubt that
the crime has been committed, then they are at liberty to give the con-
fession such weight as it is entitled to, taking into view the circum-
stances surrounding it, and the extent to which it has been cor-
roborated." 195
Undoubtedly a number of cases in which there is either ro independent
evidence or very slight independent evidence of the corpus delicti are dis-
posed of at the police level, and, thus, never brought to trial. Also a num-
ber of these cases undoubtedly result in verdicts for the defendant at trial.
However, in Pennsylvania, which has adopted the most stringent form of
the rule, the practical effect on the outcome of the reported appellate cases
has not been very marked. Of these twenty cases, fifteen were affirmed
on their merits, 9 two were affirmed because they fell within an exception
to the rule,197 and only three cases were reversed.' 9s
There was virtually no independent evidence of the corpus delicti in
one of the reversed cases and no evidence of the criminality element of the
corpus delicti in the other two cases. Thus, the fact that Pennsylvania
imposes a stringent requirement has been of little consequence to date.
The facts of the three cases that were reversed are: (1) Conviction of
larceny and receiving stolen goods reversed. The manager of the store
from which defendant confessed that he had stolen the goods testified that
the goods were of the type which he sold, that they "could" have come from
his store, and that he could not say whether or not these articles had been
194. 101 Pa. 380 (1882).
195. Id. at 386.
196. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A2d 155 (1943); Common-
wealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940); Commonwealth v. Jones, 297
Pa. 326, 146 Atl. 905 (1929); Commonwealth v. Coontz, 288 Pa. 74, 135 Atl. 538
(1927); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301 (1926); Common-
wealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 AtI. 657 (1926) ; Gray v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa.
380 (1882) ; Commonwealth v. Du Hadway, 175 Pa. Super. 201, 103 A.2d 489 (1954) ;
Commonwealth v. Adams, 174 Pa. Super. 504, 102 A.2d 202 (1954); Commonwealth
v. Young, 172 Pa. Super. 102, 92 A.2d 445 (1952); Commonwealth v. Dolph, 164
Pa. Super. 415, 65 A.2d 253 (1949); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 162 Pa. Super.
199, 56 A.2d 360 (1948); Commonwealth v. Amato, 148 Pa. Super. 151, 24 A.2d
681 (1942); Commonwealth v. Chuing, 150 Pa. Super. 445, 28 A.2d 710 (1942);
Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 94 Pa. Super. 419 (1928).
197. Commonwealth v. Danarowicz, 294 Pa. 190, 144 Atl. 127 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Jones, 97 Pa. Super. 417 (1929).
198. See cases cited in notes 199-201 infra.
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purchased.' 9 (2) Conviction of murder in the first degree, reversed. The
deceased was found hanging from a tree. An expert witness testified that
in his opinion it was suicide. Therefore, not only was there a lack of evi-
dence of criminality but there was affirmative evidence of suicide. 0° (3)
Conviction of arson reversed. There was no evidence of criminality other
than the confession. 201
In at least three of the fifteen cases Which the Pennsylvania courts
have affirmed on their merits there is a serious question as to whether
there was sufficient proof of the corpus delicti aliunde the defendant's con-
fession to warrant conviction, thus leaving some doubt as to whether the
courts require as much evidence as they claim. The facts of these three
cases are: (1) Murder in the first degree affirmed. The deceased was
found in the highway, and a wound on his head was as consistent with an
accident as with crime.20 2  (2) Murder in the first degree affirmed. The
body of the allegedly murdered infant was never found. The defendant,
who was the deceased's mother, had made false declarations and actions
in regard to the child's disappearance. This was the only evidence other
than defendant's confession.2 0° (3) Conviction of sodomy affirmed. The
only evidence was the confessions of the defendant and the girl within
each other's presence.2
CONCLUSION
The most persuasive factor in favor of the requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti is the danger that a false confession was made
either because of third degree methods by the police or because of the mental
derangement of the defendant, against both of which the rules excluding
involuntary confessions afford inadequate protection to the defendant.
The shocked consciences of the courts upon finding that defendants have
been convicted and executed solely on the basis of their confessions when
the persons whom they supposedly have murdered were not in fact dead,
and the hesitancy of the courts to convict defendants solely on their own
statements, are more historical explanations of why the rule evolved than
reasons for continuing its existence. The, other factors, although not
sufficient in themselves to support the rule, are helpful in determining the
scope to be given to the rule in particular factual situations.
Although the present rule requires independent proof of only the first
two elements of the crime, some of the factors underlying the corpus delicti
rule would provide as much reason for applying the rule to the third ele-
ment as to the first two. A value judgment is required to determine
whether society is best served by protecting the few innocent men who
would be wrongly convicted in the absence of a rule covering all three ele-
199. Commonwealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 38 A.2d 486 (1944).
200. Commonwealth v. Puglise, 276 Pa. 235, 120 Atl. 401 (1923).
201. Commonwealth v. Winter, 174 Pa. Super. 35, 98 A.2d 221 (1953).
202. Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940).
203. Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943).
204. Commonwealth v. Young, 172 Pa. Super. 102, 92 A.2d 445 (1952).
PROOF OF THE CORPUS DELICTI
ments, or by preventing the indeterminable number of guilty men from
escaping conviction because the prosecution has no evidence, except their
confessions, of their participation in the crime.
Although the courts have held consistently that reversal of the normal
order of proving the corpus delicti independently before the introduction
of the confession is in the sound discretion of the trial court, it seems that
they have overlooked the possible prejudice to the defendant which might
result. A confession might very possibly color the jury's thinking on
certain issues which it might otherwise have been able to decide objectively.
Where there is contradictory evidence as to the corpus delicti, it is
very important that the jury receive carefully-worded instructions explain-
ing that its verdict cannot rest solely on the defendant's confession. The
jury must be cautioned against allowing the confession to prejudice its
thinking in relation to the independent evidence of the corpus delicti. How-
ever, the importance of instructions is minimized if the prosecution has
presented incontrovertible physical evidence that a crime was committed.
In determining whether the corpus delicti rule should apply to a
particular case, the courts should examine the rationales and solve the
problem in the light of the reasons behind the rule. And if the rule does
apply, the most important thing for the courts to keep in mind is that
the rule is not a set formula which can be applied to the same extent in
every factual situation.
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